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Совместный доклад в Совет по правам человека

в рамках 44-й сессии Универсального периодического обзора

(Четвертый цикл, ноябрь 2023)

Антидискриминационный центр (АДЦ) Мемориал[1], Российская ЛГБТ-сеть[2], ДЕЛО ЛГБТ+[3] и Кинофестиваль “Бок о Бок”[4] подготовили этот доклад, посвященный проблемам дискриминации на основании пола, гендера, сексуальной ориентации и гендерной идентичности.

I. Распространенность дискриминации в современной России

2. С начала вторжения России в Украину власти России развернули беспрецедентные репрессии против гражданского общества, активистов и инакомыслящих. Множество организаций, правозащитников и журналистов в целях безопасности покинули Россию. Военная цензура, выход России из институтов Совета Европы, в том числе из Европейского Суда по правам человека, отказ России от множества международных обязательств, принудительная ликвидация правозащитных НКО, расширение списков "иностранных агентов", ужесточение закона "о запрете пропаганды ЛГБТ", аресты и осуждение к реальным срокам лишения свободы за мирное выражение несогласия с политикой властей - это только часть реальности, в которой оказалось российское общество.

3. Все вышесказанное напрямую связано с проблемой дискриминации, поскольку постепенная деградация российского общества под влиянием государственной пропаганды и ужесточения режима происходила в атмосфере эскалации ненависти и дискриминации в отношении различных уязвимых групп, особенно в отношении ЛГБТИ+ людей.

II. Дискриминация женщин

4. Позитивным изменением следует считать то, что список профессий, запрещенных для женщин в России, продолжает сокращаться. С 2021 года все больше рабочих мест становятся доступными для женщин (все профессии, связанные с транспортом - на море, автобусы и грузовики, все виды поездов, включая метро; работа в полиграфии). С марта 2022 года женщинам разрешено работать авиамеханиками и техниками. В конце 2022 года в Госдуму был внесен законопроект о полной отмене профессиональных запретов и исключении дискриминационной статьи из Трудового кодекса.[5]

5. В обновленной Национальной стратегии действий в интересах женщин (2023-2030) (утверждена в декабре 2022 года)[6] введены понятия "сексуальное домогательство на работе" и "сексуализированное насилие". Стратегия признает отсутствие гендерного равенства в российском обществе – в оплате труда, в бизнесе, в политике. Среди поставленных целей – "преодоление профессиональной сегрегации и расширение доступа женщин к руководящим должностям", "расширение сфер экономики с участием женщин", в том числе в традиционно мужских профессиональных сферах (точные науки, цифровые технологии, технические специальности) и другие позитивные меры, направленные на достижение равенства мужчин и женщин в сфере труда. Однако в новой Стратегии недостаточно внимания уделено проблеме домашнего насилия, дискриминации ВИЧ+ женщин, женской бедности.

6. В российском законодательстве отсутствует определение понятия "домашнее насилие", а также адекватные правовые гарантии для пресечения различных форм такого насилия, равно как и какие-либо формы охранных ордеров. Российское законодательство не отвечает требованиям, содержащимся в обязательстве государства создать и эффективно применять систему наказания за все формы домашнего насилия и обеспечивать достаточные гарантии для женщин-жертв. Законопроект о профилактике домашнего насилия остается нерассмотренным с 2016 года.

7. Между тем, в России в целом и в отдельных ее регионах, например, в регионе Северного Кавказа, остро стоит проблема насилия в отношении женщин. Известны случаи "убийств чести", похищений родственниками, отобрания детей у матерей, КЖПО[7]. Как правило, такие преступления против женщин не расследуются и воспринимаются как "норма" местными властями и значительной частью мужского населения.

III. Дискриминация по причине сексуальной ориентации и гендерной идентичности

8. На 39 сессии УПО Россия приняла ряд рекомендаций по созданию условий для свободного осуществления ЛГБТ-людьми их прав и тщательному расследованию случаев преследования гомосексуальных людей в Чечне[8].

9. Вопреки принятым рекомендациям, российские власти продолжают целенаправленную и фактически открытую политику по стигматизации и маргинализации ЛГБТ-сообщества и социальному исключению ("отмене") открытых ЛГБТ-людей из российского общества.

A. Положение ЛГБТ-людей на Северном Кавказе

10. Преследования ЛГБТ-людей на Северном Кавказе за последний годы стало обыденностью. Власти России не предприняли и не предпринимают каких-либо эффективных действий для пресечения массовой практики преследования геев на Северном Кавказе, особенно в Чеченской Республике[9]. Федеральные власти, которым подчинены правоохранительные органы, фактически открыто игнорируют эту проблематику и оставляют её полностью на откуп региональных властей. Последние не скрывают своего негативного отношения к представителям ЛГБТ-сообщества, а зачастую и вовсе публично оправдывают совершенные преступления ненависти.

11. Положение ЛГБТ-людей на Северном Кавказе можно признать бесправным. У них отсутствуют действенные механизмы защиты их прав, и фактически единственным реальным способом избежать преследования и ежедневного риска физической расправы становится бегство за границу[10] и получение убежища.

B. Речи ненависти (гомофобная пропаганда)

12. Серьезной проблемой для ЛГБТ-людей в России являются так называемые "речи ненависти". В Российской Федерации законодательно установлена ответственность за разжигание ненависти либо вражды (ст. 20.3.1 КоАП РФ, ст. 282 УК РФ), однако правоохранительные органы систематически отказываются возбуждать дела в связи с разжиганием ненависти к ЛГБТ-сообществу. В сети Интернет и СМИ публикуются видеоматериалы, поддерживающие ненавистное отношение к ЛГБТ-сообществу и унижающие достоинство ЛГБТ-людей, продолжают действовать сообщества, чьей целью является разжигание ненависти к ЛГБТ-людям[11]. Подобные материалы и сообщества не подвергаются блокировке даже после заявлений в госорганы со стороны активистов и просто неравнодушных граждан.

13. Отдельно стоит отметить официальную риторику российских властей и близких к ней публичных лиц. Так, встречаются крайне ксенофобные заявления представителей власти, которые описывают ЛГБТ-идентичности как противоречащие русским и православным ценностям, насаждаемое западной культурой чуждое России явление, как часть плана западных стран по борьбе с Россией. Депутат Государственной Думы и член правящей партии "Единая Россия" Виталий Милонов – самый известный "рупор ненависти" в российской власти, последовательно использующий "язык вражды" в отношении ЛГБТ-людей в социальных сетях и публичных выступлениях. В своих речах политик настойчиво обвиняет представителей ЛГБТ-сообщества в том, что они выступают против основополагающих православных ценностей русских людей, прямо называет ЛГБТ-людей извращенцами и реагирует на любое присутствие ЛГБТ-активистов в публичной сфере крайне оскорбительно. Какого-либо официального порицания, осуждения или критики это не встречает. Подобные речи ненависти со стороны представителей власти стали в российской политической риторике нормой.

C. Преступления ненависти (подставные свидания)

14. В России много лет остаются проблемой так называемые "подставные свидания" - вид преступлений против ЛГБТ-людей (в основном гомо- и бисексуальных мужчин и трансгендерных людей), когда потерпевшего под предлогом свидания заманивают в место, где жертва остается наедине с преступниками, а затем, угрожая раскрытием сексуальной ориентации/гендерной идентичности, применением насилия, требуют совершения определенных действий (как правило, вымогают деньги). Зачастую жертвами таких преступлений становятся люди, принадлежащие к уязвимым группам, а именно ЛГБТ-мигранты из стран, в которых принадлежность к ЛГБТ-сообществу традиционно порицается и может обернуться серьезными последствиями вплоть до лишения жизни, а также жители регионов России, где устоялась аналогичная практика.

15. Во многом сама возможность таких преступлений обусловлена создаваемой властями атмосферой нетерпимости и бесправия ЛГБТ-людей в России. Из-за этого преступники ощущают свою безнаказанность, а жертвы опасаются обращаться за защитой. Однако если потерпевший все же решился обратиться за защитой, полиция и суды систематически игнорируют мотив ненависти в таких преступлениях даже в случаях признания этого мотива обвиняемыми. Как результат, специфика "подставных свиданий" (как и других преступлений ненависти против ЛГБТ-людей) остается невидимой, а преступления в отношении ЛГБТ-людей даже при доведении их до суда рассматриваются как обычный разбой, грабеж и т.п., а не как преступление ненависти.

D. ЛГБТ-беженство

16. Россия не признает принадлежность к ЛГБТ-сообществу в качестве основания для предоставления политического убежища или международной защиты в любой иной форме, даже когда человек, испрашивающий такой защиты, в своей родной стране подвергается реальному и высокому риску не только преследования и физической расправы со стороны гомо-, би- или трансфобно настроенных участников общества, но и официальному уголовному преследованию за свою принадлежность к ЛГБТ-сообществу. Даже в ситуациях, когда заявители могут обоснованно подтвердить надежными и убедительными доказательствами конкретное преследование в стране исхода, решение российских властей никак не меняется. Отказ в предоставлении защиты жертвам преследования ведет к депортации людей в страны, где они практически неминуемо столкнутся с репрессиями по причине их сексуально ориентации/гендерной идентичности.

E. Нарушение права на уважение личной и семейной жизни

a. Непризнание однополых отношений

17. Россия не признает официально однополые отношения – ни зарегистрированные, ни фактические. В связи с этим у однополых пар отсутствуют те правовые возможности, которые имеют разнополые пары в зарегистрированном браке: право не свидетельствовать против своего супруга, льготы при предоставлении отпуска для супругов и другие гарантии трудовых прав супругов (напр., в связи с уходом за больным супругом), право на содержание нетрудоспособным супругом от трудоспособного, право на вселение супруга в социальное жилье, право на совместное супругами усыновление (удочерение), право на налоговые вычеты, посещение больного супруга в реанимации, право супруга – иностранного гражданина не быть подвергнутым выдворению из России, право супруга на получение пенсии в связи с потерей кормильца (второго супруга), гарантии интересов супругов при разделе общего имущества, нажитого в период брака, право супруга на наследство по закону (при отсутствии завещания), право быть захороненным рядом с супругом и др. Всеми этими правами однополые пары в России не обладают в силу отсутствия какого-либо механизма признания однополых отношений.

18. Это ведет к очевидной дискриминации однополых пар, что было ярко показано в деле Европейского Суда по правам человека Fedotova and others v. Russia[12], в котором Суд признал нарушение Россией прав заявителей на уважение их личной и семейной жизни.

b. Преследование гомосексуальных отцов, прибегших

к помощи суррогатных матерей

19. В сентябре 2020 г. началась массовая кампания по уголовному преследованию одиноких отцов, имевших детей от суррогатных матерей, и организаций, помогающих им в этом. По мнению следственных органов, такие отцы не могли быть донорами при экстракорпоральном оплодотворении, "так как у них нетрадиционная сексуальная ориентация". Под стражу были заключены сотрудники медицинских центров и юристы, помогавшие оформлять отношения между одинокими отцами и суррогатными матерями. Некоторые отцы с детьми покинули страну, опасаясь преследований. Фактически это представляло собой преследование одиноких отцов-геев, реализовавших естественное право на деторождение, и грубейшее вмешательство властей в личную и семейную жизнь.

20. В конечном итоге кампания вылилась в новые запреты. Приказ Министерства здравоохранения РФ от 31 июля 2020 г. N 803н, вступивший в силу с 01.01.2021 г., лишил одиноких отцов возможности официально воспользоваться помощью суррогатных матерей, а Федеральный закон от 19 декабря 2022 г. N 538-ФЗ законодательно закрепил запрет на использование суррогатного материнства одинокими мужчинами. Это удар по правам не только гомосексуальных, но и гетеросексуальных одиноких мужчин, а по существу – грубейшая гендерная дискриминация.

c. Положение ЛГБТ-родителей

21. Семейный кодекс РФ запрещает усыновление детей лицами, состоящими в однополом браке, а также лицами, не состоящими в браке и являющимися гражданами государства, в котором однополый брак разрешен (п. 13 ч. 1 ст. 127 СК РФ). Такие лица не могут быть и опекунами (попечителями) ребенка (ч. 1 ст. 146 СК РФ).

22. Власти России отказываются признавать документы о рождении детей, где как родители указаны лица одного пола. В случае рождения ребенка у одного из родителей, состоящих в однополом браке, партнер биологического родителя в России не имеет юридических возможностей быть признанным в качестве второго родителя, что порождает отсутствие у него целого ряда прав: права на совместное воспитание ребенка, права требовать возврата ребенка от лица, неправомерно удерживающего его у себя, права выступать в защиту интересов ребенка в отношениях с другими лицами и представлять интересы ребенка, права быть наследником первой очереди и др.

23. Описанная ситуация – следствие отсутствия какой-либо правовой формы признания однополых отношений в России, что ведет к дискриминации ЛГБТ-родителей, создает ситуацию правовой незащищенности партнеров, не признаваемых Россией в качестве родителей, но фактически являющихся таковыми. Это создает угрозу не только правам родителей на воспитание ребенка, но и праву ребенка на семью, на развитие и взросление в семейном окружении независимо от сексуальной ориентации своих родителей.

F. Нарушение свободы слова и свободы ассоциаций

a. “Иностранные агенты”

24. Подавляющее большинство некоммерческих ЛГБТ-организаций, правозащитных и других ЛГБТ-инициатив, а также многие ЛГБТ-активисты признаны в России т.н. "иностранными агентами"[13]. Статус "иностранного агента" накладывает существенные ограничения на деятельность, а также дополнительные обязанности перед властями: значительный объем дополнительной отчетности, фактически разрешительный характер реализации мероприятий, которые власти могут запретить под любыми предлогами, отсутствие права на участие в делами государства (напр., занятие государственных должностей, участие в совещательных, экспертных и иных органах, право быть кандидатом в депутаты или членом ОНК и др.), отсутствие права на проведение публичных мероприятий, на получение государственной поддержки, на ведение педагогической или просветительской деятельности и др. Нарушение ограничений и запретов ведет к грандиозным штрафам, а при повторном нарушении – к уголовному преследованию. Статус "иностранного агента" используется властями для "мягкого" запрета деятельности неугодных и выдавливания их из публичной сферы. Это грубейшим образом нарушает право на свободу ассоциаций и право на свободу выражения мнения, что было аргументированно отражено в решении ЕСПЧ по делу Ecodefense and others v. Russia[14].

25. Масштабное ужесточение законодательства “об иностранных агентах” к настоящему времени позволяет признать т.н. “иностранным агентом” практически любого человека, организацию, незарегистрированное объединение[15]. Признание россиян иноагентами превратилось в конвейер. Сейчас новые иноагенты вносятся в список каждую неделю по пятницам, и людей там уже больше двух сотен. Однако это лишь малая часть тех, за кем следят власти. Благодаря утечке данных Главного радиочастотного центра (ФГУП «ГРЧЦ») – организации, подведомственной главному органу, ответственному за цензуру в России – Роскомнадзору, стало известно, что власти пристально следят за гораздо большим количеством людей. На них составляются справки, которые впоследствии используются Минюстом для внесения людей в реестр иностранных агентов. Часть справок уже пошли в ход, часть все еще ждет своего часа. Логику слежки со стороны властей окончательно проследить невозможно, однако из опубликованных данных следует, что слежка за ЛГБТ-активистами ведется тотальная.

b. Преследование и ликвидация организаций

26. Преследование ЛГБТ-организаций и активистов с каждым годом становится все более привычной практикой. Признание организации или гражданина "иностранным агентом" – только один из способов борьбы с инакомыслием. Однако власти действуют более радикально и грубо: в частности, создавая физические препятствия деятельности организаций и принудительно их ликвидируя.

27. На протяжении последних пяти лет деятельности Международного ЛГБТ-кинофестиваля «Бок о Бок» не было ни одного года, когда бы фестиваль был проведен беспрепятственно, без вмешательства и срывов со стороны властей. В частности, в ноябре 2018 г. день открытия в Санкт-Петербурге был сорван депутатом Госдумы Виталием Милоновым, который сообщил, что кинофестиваль якобы удерживает заложников. В этом же году в один из дней фестиваля полиция вовсе сорвала показ, не позволив зрителям вернуться в зал после проверки сообщения о заложенной бомбе. В 2019 году в Санкт-Петербурге первые пять дней площадки фестиваля якобы “минировались неизвестными”. Правоохранительные органы демонстративно тратили несколько часов на проверку ложных сообщений о якобы заложенных бомбах. При этом несмотря на очевидность ложности таких сообщений, полиция никогда не возбуждала уголовные дела по собственной инициативе. Фестивалю требовались долгие месяцы тяжб, чтобы заставить правоохранительные органы возбудить дела о заведомо ложном сообщении об акте терроризма (ст.207 УК РФ). Ни одно уголовное дело не было доведено до установления виновных и привлечений их к ответственности.

28. В Москве в 2019 году атаки на четырехдневный фестиваль стали совершенно беспрецедентными: каждый день фестивальные площадки осаждали националисты – НОД, SERB, “Сорок сороков”. Они мешали зрителям пройти к площадке, выкрикивали оскорбления, обливали зрителей ядовитой жидкостью, снимая все на видео. Каждый фестивальный день было ложное сообщение о заложенной бомбе, а на третий день пришлось эвакуировать зрителей из зала, потому что двое националистов пронесли в зал бутылку со зловонно пахнущей жидкостью. Все эти события сотрудники полиции практически игнорировали, хотя и находились на площадке фестиваля постоянно. Лишь в первый день глава националистов и еще несколько человек были задержаны и доставлены в полицию.


29. В 2020 г. фестиваль был сорван сотрудниками полиции и санитарно-эпидемиологических служб под предлогом нарушения фестивалем антиковидных требований, а площадка фестиваля была закрыта на целую неделю даже для доступа других арендаторов.

30. Финансовый оператор Российской ЛГБТ-сети – Благотворительный фонд социально-правовой помощи «Сфера» – в 2016 г. был признан иностранным агентом. В 2022 г. «Сфера» была подвергнута беспрецедентной проверке со стороны Минюста России. Организацией были представлены практически все документы за период последних 3 лет деятельности, около 5000 листов документов. По результатам проверки в феврале 2022 г. «Сфере» был предъявлен иск о ликвидации по причине якобы имевшихся в деятельности организации "грубых и неустранимых нарушений". Фактически же основания ликвидации сводились к нарушению т.н. "традиционных семейных ценностей", продвижению "чуждой для России идеологии ЛГБТ" и, таким образом, "подрыву основ конституционного строя России" и "созданию угроз безопасности страны". Несмотря на абсурдность подобных обвинений, суд удовлетворил иск. В сентября 2022 г. после рассмотрения апелляции решение суда вступило в законную силу. 20.10.2022 г. «Сфера» была исключена из Единого государственного реестра юридических лиц и прекратила свое существование в России. После ликвидации финансового оператора Российская ЛГБТ-сеть продолжила свою деятельность как незарегистрированное общественное объединение, которое ранее тоже было внесено в список "иностранных агентов".

c. Запрет «пропаганды»

31. Наиболее ярким проявлением государственной гомофобии стал принятый в 2013 г. федеральный закон о т.н. "запрете пропаганды нетрадиционных сексуальных отношений среди несовершеннолетних". Закон подвергся критике со стороны множества международных организаций[16]. Однако в конце 2022 г. власти России пошли еще дальше: был принят и вступил в силу закон о тотальном запрете «пропаганды ЛГБТ», как среди несовершеннолетних, так и взрослых. Требование касается любых источников информации — кино, книг, компьютерных игр, СМИ и т.д., запрещено продавать любые товары, которые содержат такую информацию (в том числе книги, кинофильмы и т.д.). За нарушение запрета «пропаганды ЛГБТ» грозит штраф от 50 до 400 тысяч рублей для граждан, от 100 до 800 тысяч — для должностных лиц, от 800 тысяч до 5 млн рублей — для юрлиц или приостановление их деятельности до 90 суток.

32. Этот запрет уже стал причиной множества случаев цензуры, в особенности в книжной индустрии и в кино. Книжные магазины и сервисы электронных книг изымают из продажи и доступа книги, содержащие даже минимальную ЛГБТ-тематику, т.к. опасаются применения новых репрессивных законов. Роскомнадзор распространил список кинолент, которые запрещено показывать теперь в России, даже с маркировкой 18+. Среди этих кинокартин: «Горбатая гора», «Назови меня своим именем», сериал «Будет больно» и др. Все они уже недоступны на российских онлайн-киносервисах.

33. Этим же законом был введен новый запрет на распространение среди детей информации, "демонстрирующей нетрадиционные сексуальные отношения", включая описание, изображение нетрадиционных сексуальных отношений. Фактически это запрещает даже упоминания ЛГБТ среди несовершеннолетних. За нарушение грозит штраф от 50 до 200 тысяч рублей для граждан, от 100 до 400 тысяч — для должностных лиц, и от 800 тысяч до 4 млн рублей — для юрлиц.

34. Подобные запреты грубо нарушают международные стандарты в области прав человека не только по отношению ко взрослым представителям ЛГБТ-сообщества, что не раз устанавливалось международными организациями[17]. Они нарушают и права детей на получение информации, в том числе информации по вопросам сексуальной ориентации/гендерной идентичности как элемента их свободы искать, получать и передавать информацию и идеи любого рода (ст.13 Конвенции о правах ребенка). Запрет также не согласуется с рекомендациями учреждений ООН, в частности с Международным техническим руководством по сексуальному образованию, составленному на основе фактов и научных данных ЮНЕСКО совместно с ЮНИСЕФ, ВОЗ, ЮНЭЙДС и др.[18]

35. Главный орган российской государственной цензуры – Роскомнадзор – массово блокирует неугодные властям России информационные ресурсы, в том числе содержащие информацию об ЛГБТ. В 2021 г. Федеральное агентство по делам молодежи (Росмолодёжь) также стала одним из инициаторов внесудебных блокировок ЛГБТ-ресурсов под предлогом защиты интересов несовершеннолетних[19].

36. В конце 2021 г. сайты и онлайн-кинотеатр Международного ЛГБТ-кинофестиваля «Бок о Бок» были во внесудебном порядке заблокированы Роскомнадзором на основании решения Росмолодежи. Несмотря на возрастные ограничения сайтов и онлайн-кинотеатра (18+), причиной блокировки явился уже традиционный для властей повод — т. н. «пропаганда нетрадиционных сексуальных отношений среди несовершеннолетних». Фестиваль обратился в суд для признания блокировок незаконными, однако суд отказал в удовлетворении требований.

37. Аналогичным преследованиям подверглись сайты Российской ЛГБТ-сети, портала Парни+, Онлайн-музей ЛГБТ-истории России и многих других ЛГБТ-ресурсов, вплоть до групп ЛГБТ-знакомств в социальных сетях.

38. В конце 2022 г. правительство России внесло информацию, «пропагандирующую нетрадиционные сексуальные отношения и (или) предпочтения, педофилию, смену пола» в перечень контента для внесения в единый реестр запрещенных сайтов Роскомнадзора[20], что фактически узаконило и значительно упростило внесудебную процедуру блокировок информации об ЛГБТ Роскомнадзором. Сам Роскомнадзор не скрывает уже массовых блокировок ЛГБТ-ресурсов: в январе 2023 г. орган официально отчитался, что с момента вступления в силу 6 декабря 2022 г. закона о запрете «пропаганды ЛГБТ» в реестр запрещенной информации было внесено 306 сайтов с ЛГБТ-тематикой.

39. В декабре 2021 г. Министерство культуры России отказало Международному ЛГБТ-кинофестивалю «Бок о Бок» во включении в т.н. перечень проводимых на территории России международных фестивалей на 2022 г. Основание отказа сводилось к тому что кинофестиваль «пропагандирует нетрадиционные сексуальные отношения среди несовершеннолетних», несмотря на то, что фестиваль всегда и везде делал возрастное ограничение 18+. Фактически это означало запрет на официальное проведение кинофестиваля в России в 2022 г. даже в онлайн-формате. В октябре 2022 г. было вынесено решение Арбитражного суда г. Москвы об отказе в признании незаконным отказа Министерства культуры.

40. С принятием закона о «пропаганде» силовиками регулярно проводятся незаконные рейды по преследованию ЛГБТ-инициатив. Так, в феврале 2023 года полиция и Центр «Э»[21] пришли с обыском в комьюнити-центр Дальневосточного общественного движения «Маяк» во время встречи группы поддержки ЛГБТ-людей. У представителей правоохранительных органов не было ни ордера об обыске, ни постановления суда, они утверждали, что это не обыск, а «осмотр». Через час после обыска присутствующих увезли в отдел и стали допрашивать. Одному из молодых людей во время обыска начали угрожать насилием, и под давлением он дал доступ к своему телефону – полицейские стали читать переписки и фотографировать их. Есть основания полагать, что с ростом государственной гомо, би- и трансфобии такие акции устрашения будут происходить чаще и затрагивать не только правозащитные, просветительские и иные некоммерческие ЛГБТ-инициативы, но и гей-клубы[22], ЛГБТ-вечеринки и другие места компактного собрания ЛГБТ-людей.

G. Дискриминация Т-людей

41. 20.05.2022 г. Министерством здравоохранения РФ был издан приказ № 342-н[23], расширяющий перечень видов трудовой деятельности, которые требуют обязательного психиатрического освидетельствования. Одновременно с этим правительство РФ распоряжением № 3759-р от 05.12.2022 утвердило перечень медицинских психиатрических противопоказаний для осуществления отдельных видов деятельности и деятельности, связанной с источником повышенной опасности. В указанном перечне наряду с такими диагнозами, как шизофрения и бредовые расстройства, содержатся диагнозы с F.60 по F.69 (МКБ-10) включительно.

42. При этом в России диагноз F.64 ("расстройства половой идентификации") ставится трансгендерным людям в том числе в рамках процедуры получения медицинского заключения о смене пола, необходимого для изменения гендерного маркера в официальных документах.

43. Хотя названный перечень требует, чтобы диагноз сопровождался "хроническими и затяжными с тяжелыми стойкими или часто обостряющимися болезненными проявлениями", само по себе включение в перечень диагноза F.64 в очередной раз демонстрирует государственную патологизацию трансгендерности, а размытые формулировки создают высокие риски закрытия для трансгендерных людей целых видов трудовой деятельности в силу самого факта трансгендерности[24]. Включение диагноза F.64 в указанный перечень явно необоснованно, поскольку трансгендерность объективно не мешает выполнять трудовую функцию и неопасно для окружающих.

44. Комиссии, выдающие медицинские заключения, необходимые для смены гендерного маркера в официальных документах, созданы лишь в нескольких регионах России[25]. Это создает значительные трудности для Т-людей, проживающих там, где такие комиссии отсутствуют. Сами комиссии, как правило, созданы на базе частных медицинских организаций, а их прохождение стоит значительных денег и может занимать не один день. Фактически власти, создав правовую рамку для смены документов[26], полностью устранились от помощи Т-людям в этом вопросе.

45. Глубокую озабоченность вызывает судебная практика, касающаяся признания браков, один из супругов в которых - трансгендерный человек, недействительными по причине их якобы фиктивности.

46. Так, в ноябре 2022 году Пролетарский районный суд г. Твери признал недействительным брак двух женщин. Брак был заключен до смены супругом документов на женские, таким образом, в ЗАГС были представлены два паспорта будущих супругов: мужской и женский. Уже находясь в браке, супруг осуществил смену документов и юридически стал рассматриваться как женщина. Прокурор Пролетарского района г. Твери обратился в районный суд с иском о признании брака недействительным в связи с его фиктивностью. В своем решении Суд указал, что не может согласиться с доводами представителей ответчиков о том, что между лицами, заключившими брак, «существовали и существуют семейные отношения», поэтому их брак не может быть признан действительным. Решение было обосновано тем, что на момент рассмотрения дела оба супруга были женщинами, что, в соответствии с требованиями российского законодательства, препятствует заключению брака.

47. При этом в законодательстве России отсутствует такое основание для признания брака недействительным, как «смена пола одним из супругов», а такое основание, как «фиктивность брака» подразумевает, что супруги или один из них не намеревались создать семью (ч. 1 ст. 27 СК РФ). Более того, важно отметить, что, согласно требованиям закона, брак признается недействительным со дня его заключения (ч.4 ст.27 СК РФ), что влечет аннулирование всех юридических последствий брака даже за период до смены гендерных документов.

48. Известно о еще нескольких аналогичных исках. Практика получает свое дальнейшее распространение по всей России и свидетельствует о грозящем наступлении на семейные права Т-людей, включая лишение прав, приобретенных в период брака (напр., право на раздел общего имущества супругов, право на наследование, право быть признанным отцом ребенка в силу состояния в браке с матерью на момент рождения ребенка и др.).

Рекомендации

В свете описанных проблем мы призываем российские власти принять следующие меры для соблюдения своих международных обязательств и повышения уровня защиты прав человека:
● отменить список профессий, запрещенных для женщин, а также исключить дискриминационную статью 253 из Трудового кодекса РФ;
● принять комплексный закон о предотвращении домашнего насилия, включающий адекватное определение различных форм домашнего насилия; материальные, правовые и процессуальные положения о привлечении агрессора к ответственности; специальные защитные меры (охранные ордера);
● уделить особое внимание положению женщин на Северном Кавказе: обеспечить эффективное расследование преступлений, совершенных против женщин и девочек, включая "убийства чести", калечащие операции на половых органах, ранние браки по сговору, преследование по признаку СОГИ;
● внимательно и полно исполнить принятые на 39 сессии УПО рекомендации по всестороннему, объективному и беспристрастному расследованию преступлений против гомосексуальных граждан в Чечне;
● принять меры к прекращению речей ненависти и нетерпимости в публичном пространстве, особенно в СМИ, по отношению к ЛГБТ-людям;
● признавать мотив ненависти к ЛГБТ в качестве отягчающего признака в соответствии с уголовным законом и надлежащим образом расследовать такие преступления ненависти;
● гарантировать международную защиту беженцам, подвергающимся преследованию в том числе по причине СОГИ;
● создать правовой механизм признания однополых отношений (напр., партнерства) для предоставления однополым парам правового режима, максимально близкого правовому режиму зарегистрированных разнополых отношений, в том числе в вопросах воспитания детей;
● устранить правовые ограничения на использование помощи суррогатных матерей для одиноких отцов;
● ввести законодательный запрет ограничения родительских прав или любого иного вмешательства в семью по причине сексуальной ориентации/гендерной идентичности родителей или детей, а также обеспечить юридическое признание однополых родителей;
● прекратить репрессии в отношении ЛГБТ-организаций и инициатив, признание их “иностранными агентами” и принудительные ликвидации;
● прекратить практику блокировок информационных ресурсов, содержащих ЛГБТ-тематику;
● отменить запрет пропаганды нетрадиционных сексуальных отношений и запрет детям получать информацию об ЛГБТ-отношениях, соответствующую их возрасту и развитию;
● обеспечить соблюдение семейных прав Т-людей, совершивших переход и официальную смену гендерного маркера, в том числе обеспечить сохранность (неприкосновенность) зарегистрированного брака, признание и сохранение родительских прав в отношении детей и пр.;
● принять конкретные меры к депатологизации трансгендерности и исключению диагноза F.64 из нормативных документов, препятствующих осуществление трудовой деятельности с данным диагнозом.

Joint Submission to the Human Rights Council at the 44th Session of the Universal Periodic Review

Russian Federation

(Fourth cycle, November 2023)
Anti-Discrimination Centre (ADC) Memorial1, the Russian LGBT Network2, DELO LGBT+3 and Side by Side film festival4 made this joint submission in relation to the problems of discrimination based on sex, gender, sexual orientation and gender identity.

I. Omnipresence of discrimination in contemporary Russia

2. Since the beginning of Russia's invasion to Ukraine, the Russian authorities have escalated unprecedented repression against civil society, activists and any dissenters. Many organizations, human rights defenders and journalists have left Russia for security reasons. Military censorship, Russia's withdrawal from the Council of Europe institutions, including the ECHR, Russia's rejection of many international obligations, forced liquidation of human rights NGOs, expansion of lists of "foreign agents", tightening of the law "on the prohibition of LGBT propaganda", arrests and convictions to real terms of imprisonment for peaceful expression of disagreement with the state policy – all this is only a part of the new reality faced by Russian society.

3. All of the above is directly related to the issue of discrimination, since the gradual degradation of Russian society under the influence of state propaganda and the tightening of the regime took place in an atmosphere of escalating hatred and discrimination against various vulnerable groups, especially against LGBTI+ people.

II. Discrimination of women

4. As a positive aspect, the List of Professions Banned for Women in Russia continues to be shortened. Since 2021, more and more jobs have become available for women (all transport related jobs – at sea, buses and trucks, all kind of trains, including metro; work in a printing workshop). Since March 2022, women are permitted to work as aircraft mechanics and technicians. In the end of 2022, a bill was introduced to the State Duma on the total abolishment of professional bans and exclusion of the discriminatory article from the Labor Code.5

5. In the updated National Strategy of Actions in the Interests of Women (2023-2030) (approved in December, 2022),6 the concepts of "sexual harassment at work" and "sexualized violence" were introduced, as well as the tasks to "increase digital literacy", "interest in exact sciences", "popularization of technical specialties" among women. The Strategy recognizes the lack of gender equality in Russian society, namely in wages, in business, in politics. Among the goals, there are "overcoming occupational segregation and expanding women's access to leadership positions", "expanding the spheres of the economy with the participation of women", and other positive measures aimed at achieving equality of men and women in employment. However, in the new Strategy, not enough attention is paid to the problem of domestic violence, nor to discrimination of HIV+ women, to female poverty.

6. The Russian legislation lacks a definition of "domestic violence", as well as adequate substantive and procedural legal provisions for the prosecution of its various forms, or any form of restraining orders. Russian legislation does not meet the requirements laid down in the positive commitment of the State to create and effectively apply a system of punishment for all forms of domestic violence and to provide sufficient guarantees for women victims. The bill on prevention of domestic violence has never been considered since 2016.

7. Meanwhile, in Russia as a whole and in its particular regions such as in the region of North Caucasus, the problem of violence against women is acute. There are cases of “honor killings”, kidnappings by relatives, taking children away from mothers, FGM7. As a rule, such crimes against women are not investigated and are perceived “normal” by local authorities and an essential part of the male population.

III. Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity

8. At the 39th session of the UPR, Russia adopted a series of recommendations to create conditions for LGBTI+ people to exercise their rights and to conduct a thorough investigation into the persecution of gay people in Chechnya8.

9. Nevertheless, the Russian government continues to openly pursue a targeted policy of stigmatizing and marginalizing LGBTI+ communities and excluding (“canceling”) openly LGBTI+ people from Russian society.

A. Situation of LGBTI+ people in the North Caucasus

10. The persecution of LGBTI+ people in the North Caucasus has become commonplace in recent years. The Russian authorities have not taken any effective steps to suppress the large-scale practice of persecuting gay men in the North Caucasus, particularly in the Chechen Republic. The federal government, which is in charge of law enforcement bodies, has done almost nothing to conceal its reluctance to investigate this problem and has left the solution up to regional governments, which have done nothing to hide their negative attitude toward members of the LGBTI+ community and sometimes even publicly condone hate crimes that have been committed.

11. LGBTI+ people in the North Caucasus have been deprived of their civil rights: They have no viable mechanisms for protecting their rights, and the only real way to avoid persecution and the daily risk of physical reprisals is to flee abroad9 and be granted granted asylum.

B. Hate speech (homophobic propaganda)

12. So-called “hate speech” is a major problem for LGBTI+ people in Russia. Russian law provides for liability for inciting hatred or enmity (Art. 20.3.1 of the Russian Administrative Offenses Code, Art. 282 of the Russian Criminal Code), but law enforcement agencies regularly refuse to open cases concerning incitement of hatred of the LGBTI+ community. Videos supporting a hateful attitude toward the LGBTI+ community and degrading LGBTI+ people are being published online and in the media, and groups whose goal is to incite hatred of LGBTI+ people continue to be active.10 These materials and groups are not blocked even after activists and concerned citizens file complaints with state agencies.

13. It is worth making separate note of the official rhetoric of the Russian authorities and public figures close to them. For example, Russian officials have made extremely xenophobic statements that describe LGBTI+ identity as contrary to Russian and Orthodox values, as a phenomenon propagated by Western culture that is alien to Russia, and as a part of the West’s plan to fight Russia. Vitaly Milonov, a State Duma deputy and member of the United Russia ruling party, is the best known “mouthpiece of hate” in the Russian government and consistently uses “hate speech” directed at LGBTI+ people on social media and in his public comments. In his speeches, he persistently accuses members of the LGBTI+ community of standing against the foundational Orthodox values of the Russian people, openly calls LGBTI+ people perverts, and responds to the presence of LGBTI+ activists in the public sphere with highly offensive language. His words are never met with any official reprimands, condemnation, or criticism. Such hate speech has become the norm in Russian political rhetoric.

C. Hate crimes (fake dates)

14. So-called “fake dates” have been a problem in Russia for many years. This is a type of crime against LGBTI+ people (mainly gay and bisexual men and transgender people) where, under the pretext of a date, the victim is lured to a place where they are left alone with criminals; then, under threat of disclosure of their sexual orientation or gender identity or the threat of violence, they are required to commit certain actions (they are generally subjected to extortion). The victims of such crimes are often people from vulnerable groups, namely LGBTI+ migrants from countries where membership in the LGBTI+ community is generally condemned and could result in serious consequences up to deprivation of life, as well as residents of Russian regions that have a similar practice.

15. In many ways, the very opportunity for such crimes is a result of the atmosphere of intolerance created by the authorities and the powerlessness of LGBTI+ people in Russia. Because of this, criminals have a sense of impunity and victims are afraid to seek protection. When a victim does decide to seek protection, the police and the courts systematically ignore the motive of hate, even in cases where the accused admits that hate was a motive. As a result, the specific characteristics of “fake dates” (and other hate crimes against LGBTI+ people) remain invisible, while crimes against LGBTI+ people are viewed, even by the courts, as regular robberies, thefts, and so forth, and not as hate crimes.

D. LGBTI+ refugees

16. Russia does not recognize membership in the LGBTI+ community as a ground for political asylum or international protection in any form, even when a person seeking such protection faces a grave and high risk at home of both persecution and physical violence on the part of homophobic, biphobic, and transphobic members of society and criminal prosecution for being part of the LGBTI+ community. Even in cases where applicants can provide reliable and convincing evidence of concrete persecution in their country of origin, the Russian authorities never alter their decision. The Russian authorities’ refusal to provide protection to the victims of persecution means that these people are deported to a country where they will not be able to avoid repressions on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity.

E. Right to respect for private and family life

a. Nonrecognition of same-sex relationships

17. Russia does not officially recognize same-sex relationships, registered or otherwise. Because of this, same-sex couples do not have the same legal guarantees as heterosexual couples in registered unions, including the right not to testify against a spouse; spousal benefits for vacations and other guarantees of a spouse’s labor rights (for example, caring for a sick spouse); the right for a spouse who cannot work to receive support from a spouse who can; the right to move into municipal housing; the right for a couple to jointly adopt a child; the right to tax deductions; the right to visit a spouse in the ICU; the right of a foreign-born spouse to not be deported from Russia; the right of a spouse to receive a pension in connection with the loss of a breadwinner (the other spouse); a guarantee that the interests of both spouses will be observed when shared property acquired during marriage is split; the right of a spouse to an inheritance under the law (if there is no will); the right to be buried next to a spouse; and so forth. Same-sex couples in Russia do not have any of these rights because there is no mechanism for recognizing same-sex relationships.

18. This leads to obvious discrimination against same-sex couples, which was starkly demonstrated in the European Court of Human Rights case Fedotova and Others v. Russia11, where the Court found that Russia violated the applicants’ rights to respect for their private and family life.

b. Persecution of gay fathers using surrogate mothers

19. September 2020 marked the launch of a mass campaign to criminally prosecute single fathers with children from surrogate mothers and the organizations that help facilitate these relationships. Investigative bodies believed that such fathers should not be donors for in vitro fertilization “because they have a non-traditional sexual orientation”. Staff from medical centers and lawyers who helped arrange the relationships between the single fathers and the surrogate mothers were taken into custody. Fearing prosecution, some fathers left the country with their children. This effectively amounted to the persecution of single gay fathers exercising their natural right to have children and the gross interference of the authorities in private and family life.

20. In the end, this campaign led to new bans. Order of the Russian Health Ministry of July 31, 2020 No. 803n, which entered into force on Jan. 1, 2021, deprived single fathers of the ability to officially use surrogate mothers, and Federal Law of Dec. 19, 2022 No. 538-FZ banned single men from using surrogacy. This is a blow not just to the rights of gay men, but also to the rights of single heterosexual men, and it amounts to egregious gender discrimination.

c. LGBTI+ parents

21. Russia’s Family Code prohibits people in same-sex marriages and people who are citizens of a country that allows same-sex marriage and are unmarried from adopting children (Art. 127(1)(13) of the Russian Family Code). Such people also cannot be foster parents (guardians) for a child (Art. 146(1) of the Family Code).

22. The Russian authorities refuse to recognize birth certificates listing parents of the same gender. In Russia, if a baby is born to one parent in a same-sex marriage, the biological parent’s partner cannot legally be recognized as the second parent, which deprives that parent of a number of rights: the right to raise a child together; the right to demand that a child be returned from a person who is wrongfully keeping that child; the right to advocate for the child’s interests in relationships with other people and represent the child’s interests; the right to be the heir apparent; and so forth.

23. This situation is an extension of the absence of any legal form for recognizing same-sex relationships in Russia; it results in discrimination against LGBTI+ parents and does not provide legal protection for partners whom Russia does not recognize as parents but who are in actual fact parents. This creates a threat not just to the rights of parents to raise a child, but also to the child’s right to a family and the child’s right to develop and grow up in a family environment regardless of their parents’ sexual orientation.

F. Freedom of speech and freedom of association

a. “Foreign agents”

24. Most non-profit LGBTI+ organizations, human rights and other LGBTI+ initiatives, and many LGBTI+ activists in Russia have been deemed so-called “foreign agents”12. The “foreign agent” status entails significant restrictions on activities and additional obligations to the authorities: a large volume of additional reporting; what amounts to the need for permission to hold events, which the authorities can ban for any reason; the lack of the right to participate in government affairs (for example, holding public office; participating in advisory, expert, or other bodies; the right to be a parliamentary candidate or public monitoring commission member, etc.); the lack of the right to hold public events, receive government support, conduct pedagogical or outreach activities; and so forth. Violation of restrictions and bans results in enormous fines and, in the case of a repeat violation, criminal prosecution. The authorities use the “foreign agent” status to put a “soft” ban on the activities of undesirable people and organizations and squeeze them out their activities and, especially, the public sphere. This is an egregious violation of the right to freedom of association and the right to freedom of expression, which was clearly reflected in the ECtHR’s judgment in the case of Ecodefense and others v. Russia13.

25. The large-scale negative development of the legislation on “foreign agents” currently makes it possible to recognize as so-called “foreign agent” almost any person, organization, or unregistered association.14 The Ministry of Justice operates like a factory on recognition people as “foreign agents” updating the registry weekly on Fridays. Currently there are more than two hundred people on the list; however, this is only a small part of those who are being monitored. Thanks to the data leak from the Head Radiofrequency Center,15 it became known that the authorities are closely monitoring a much larger number of people. Summary reports were drawn up on them and were already used or by the Ministry of Justice for inclusion into the registry of “foreign agents”. The logic of surveillance by the authorities cannot be definitively traced; however, as it follows from the published data, LGBT activists are under total surveillance.

b. Persecution and liquidation of NGOs

26. The persecution of LGBTI+ organizations and activists is becoming more common every year. Deeming an organization or citizen a “foreign agent” is only one way of combatting dissenting views. But the authorities are also resorting to more radical and egregious methods, namely by creating physical barriers to activity and forcing organizations to shut down.

27. Over the past five years of the Side by Side International LGBT Film Festival’s activities, there has not been one year when the festival was held freely, without any interference or disruption on the part of the authorities. For example, in November 2018, the festival’s opening day in St. Petersburg was disrupted by State Duma Deputy Vitaly Milonov, who announced that the film festival was allegedly holding people hostage. That same year, the police interrupted a showing and did not allow the audience to return to the space where the film was being shown after a bomb scare. During the first five days of the festival in St. Petersburg in 2019, spaces used by the festival were allegedly “mined by unknown people.” Law enforcement agencies deliberately wasted several hours of the festival on checking false reports of bombs that had allegedly been placed at the festival. And even though the reports were clearly fake, the police never opened criminal cases at their own initiative. It took the Festival several months of legal battles to force law enforcement agencies to open cases on knowingly making a false report about an act of terrorism (Art. 207 of the Russian Criminal Code). None of the criminal cases have reached the point of identifying and prosecuting the guilty parties.

28. The level of attacks at the four-day festival in Moscow in 2019 was completely unprecedented: Every day, the festival spaces were besieged by nationalists like the National Liberation Movement, SERB, and Forty Forties. They prevented audience members from entering the space, shouted insults, and doused the audience with a poisonous liquid, recording this all on video. There were false reports of bombs every day of the festival, and on the third day, spectators had to be removed from the hall because two nationalists had brought in a bottle containing a foul smelling liquid. Police officers ignored all these events, even though they were on site for the entire festival. It was only on the first day that the head of the nationalists and several other people were detained and delivered to the police.

29. In 2020, the festival was disrupted by police officers and sanitary and epidemiological officials under the pretext of violation of the festival’s COVID requirements, and the space was closed for an entire week even to other groups leasing it.

30. The Sphere charitable foundation for social and legal assistance, which is the Russian LGBT Network’s financial backer, was deemed a “foreign agent” in 2016. In 2022, it was subjected to an unprecedented check by the Russian Justice Ministry. The organization had to submit almost all its records for the past three years, which amounted to almost 5,000 pages of documents. As a result of the check, a liquidation claim was filed against the financial backer in February 2022 because of “gross and irreversible violations” allegedly present in its activities. In fact, however, the grounds for liquidation came down to violating so-called “traditional family values,” promoting “LGBTI+ ideology alien to Russia,” and, consequently, “undermining the foundations of Russia’s constitutional order” and “creating a threat to the country’s security.” The court upheld the claim in spite of the absurd nature of the charges. The court ruling entered into force in September 2022 after the appeal was reviewed. The financial backer was removed from the Unified State Register of Legal Entities on October 20, 2022, which marked the end of its existence in Russia. After the legal entity of the financial backer was shut down, the Russian LGBT Network continued its activities as an unregistered social movement, which had also previously been added to the “foreign agents” list.

c. Propaganda ban

31. The most egregious manifestation of state homophobia is the federal law on a so-called “ban on the promotion of non-traditional sexual relations to minors”, which was adopted in 2013. This law has been criticized by many international organizations16. However, the Russian authorities went even further in late 2022: A law imposing a total ban on the promotion of LGBTI+ issues to both minors and adults was adopted and entered into force. The requirement relates to anything from which information can be extracted – movies, books, computer games, the media and so forth. Any goods containing such information (including books, movies, etc.) are also banned from sale. Violations of this ban entail a fine of 50,000 to 400,000 rubles for individuals; 100,000 to 800,000 rubles for officials; and 800,000 to 5 million rubles for legal entities or suspension of activities for up to 90 days.

32. This ban has already caused numerous cases of censorship, particularly in the book and film industries. Bookstores and e-book services are making books containing even passing references to LGBTI+ topics unavailable, because they fear that the new repressive laws will be applied against them. Roskomnadzor has distributed a list of movies and series that cannot be shown in Russia now, even if they are rated 18+. These include Brokeback Mountain, Call Me by Your Name, the series This Is Going to Hurt, and others. None of these are available from Russian online movie services.

33. This same law introduced a new ban on the distribution to children of information “portraying non-traditional sexual relations”, including a description or depiction of non-traditional sexual relations. This effectively amounts to a ban on even mentioning LGBTI+ issues to minors. Violations of this ban entail a fine of 50,000 to 200,000 rubles for individuals; 100,000 to 400,000 rubles for officials; and 800,000 to 4 million rubles for legal entities.

34. Such bans are a gross violation of international human rights standards, and not just in relation to adult members of the LGBTI+ community, which is a fact that international organizations have repeatedly established.17 They also violate the right of children to receive information, including information about sexual orientation and gender identity, as an element of their freedom to see, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds (Art. 13 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child). The ban is also at odds with recommendations made by UN institutions, namely the International Technical Guidance on Sexuality Education, which was compiled on the basis of facts and scientific data from UNESCO in conjunction with UNICEF, the WHO, UNAIDS, and others.18

35. Roskomnadzor, the main state agency responsible for censorship, massively blocks undesirable information resources, including those who spread information about LGBT people. In 2021, the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs (Rosmolodezh) also initiated extrajudicial blockings of LGBT resources under the pretext of protecting the interests of minors19.

36. At the end of 2021, the websites and the online cinema of the Side by Side International LGBT Film Festival were arbitrarily blocked by Roskomnadzor based on the decision of Rosmolodezh. Despite the marked rate 18+, the resources were blocked based on the usual reason – the so-called "propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations among minors". The court rejected the appeal for unblocking.

37. The sites of the Russian LGBT Network, the Parni+ portal, the Online Museum of LGBT History of Russia and many other LGBT resources, up to LGBT dating groups in social networks, were similarly persecuted.

38. At the end of 2022, the Russian government included information "promoting non-traditional sexual relations and (or) preferences, paedophilia, sex change" in the list of content for inclusion in the Roskomnadzor unified register of banned sites,20 which in fact legalized and simplified the extrajudicial procedure for blocking information about LGBT people. In January 2023, Roskomnadzor officially reported on the inclusion of 306 websites containing information of LGBTI+ to the register of prohibited information, since December 6, 2022 (the entry into force of the law on the "LGBT propaganda ban").

39. In December 2021, the Ministry of Culture refused to include the Side by Side International LGBT Film Festival in the list of international festivals to be held on the territory of Russia in 2022. The ground of the refusal was explained as the Side by Side "promotes non-traditional sexual relations among minors", despite the fact that the festival has always marked the rate 18+. In fact, this meant a ban on the film festival in Russia in 2022, even in an online format. In October 2022, the Arbitration Court of Moscow refused to recognize illegal the decision of the Ministry of Culture.

40. Since the adoption of the “propaganda law”, the security forces used to conduct illegal raids on LGBTI+ initiatives on a regular basis. In February 2023, the police and the Center "E"21 searched the community center of the Far Eastern Public Movement "Mayak", right during a group meeting in support of LGBTI+ people. The law enforcement officials had neither a search warrant nor a court order, explaining their visit as an "inspection". An hour after the search, the meeting participants were taken to the police station for interrogation. Being threatened with violence during the search, a young man had to give the police access to his phone; his correspondence was read and copied. There are reasons to believe that with the growth of state homo-bi-transphobia, such acts of pressure and intimidation will occur often and affect not only human rights, educational and other non-profit LGBTI+ initiatives, but also gay clubs,22 LGBT-parties and other places of meetings of LGBTI+ people.

G. Discrimination of transgender people

41. On May 5, 2022, the Russian Health Ministry published Order No. 342-n23, which expands the list of work activities requiring a mandatory psychiatric evaluation. At the same time, the Russian Government’s Order No. 3759-r of Dec. 5, 2022 approved a list of medical psychiatric counterindications for performing certain types of jobs and hazardous activities. Along with diagnoses like schizophrenia and delusional disorders, the list contains diagnoses F.60 through F.69 (ICD-10).

42. In Russia, the F.64 diagnosis (“gender identity disorders”) is given to transgender people, including as part of the procedure for receiving the medical opinion on gender transition required for a person to have their gender marker changed in official documents.

43. Even though this list requires that a diagnosis be accompanied by “chronic and prolonged symptoms of illness that are persistent or often become aggravated,” the inclusion of F.64 in this list is just another reflection of the state’s pathologization of transgender people, and the vague wording of these documents creates the high risk that entire areas of work activities will be shut off to transgender people just because they are transgender24. There are clearly no grounds for including the F.64 diagnosis in this list, since it does not objectively interfere with the performance of work function and poses no danger to others.

44. Commissions issuing medical opinions required for a person to change their gender marker in their official documents exist in only several regions of Russia25. This creates major difficulties for transgender people living in regions that do not have these commissions. The commissions themselves are generally part of a private medical organization; the process of obtaining an opinion is expensive and can take many days. The government created a legal framework for changing documents26, but it has effectively abandoned any effort to help transgender people with this process.

45. Judicial practice of recognition of marriages invalid due to “fictitiousness” in case of one of the spouses is a transgender person is of high concern.

46. In November 2022, the Proletarski District Court of Tver invalidated the marriage of two females which was concluded before the spouse changed the documents from male’s to female’s ones; thus, at the moment of registration, there were no formal obstacles for the marriage. The court refused the arguments of the defendants' representatives that "family relations have existed" between the married persons, therefore their marriage could not be recognized as “fictious”. The court satisfied the prosecutor's claims on “fictitiousness” being based on the fact that currently both spouses were women, which, in line with the Russian legislation, is an obstacle for marriage.

47. At the same time, in the Russian legislation "sex change by one of the spouses" doesn’t exist among the grounds for invalidating a marriage, while "fictitious marriage" implies that the spouse(s) doesn’t intend to start a family (Art. 27.1 of the Family Code). It is important to note that according to the law, marriage is recognized as invalid from the date of its conclusion (Art. 27.4 of the Family Code), which annulates all legal consequences of marriage happened even before the change of gender documents.

48. This practice is further spreading throughout Russia and indicates a threatening attack on the family rights of T-people, including deprivation of rights acquired during marriage (e.g., the right to divide the common property of spouses, the right to inheritance, the right to be recognized as a father due to the state of marriage with a mother at the time of birth of a child etc

Recommendations

In light of these problems, we call on the Russian government to take the following measures to comply with its international obligations and increase the level of protection for human rights:
● cancel the list of professions banned for women, as well as exclude the discriminative article 253 from the Labor Code;
● adopt a comprehensive law on prevention of domestic violence which would inlcude an adequate definition of different forms of domestic violence; material, legal and procedural provisions on persecution of aggressors; special protective measures (restraining orders);
● pay special attention to the situation of women in the North Caucasus: provide effective investigation of crimes committed against women and girls, including "honor killings", FGM, early arranged marriages, persecution based on SOGI;
● carefully and fully implement the recommendations adopted at the 39th UPR session concerning comprehensive, objective, and impartial investigation of crimes against gay citizens in Chechnya;
● take measures to suppress hate speech and intolerance relating to LGBTI+ people in public space, particularly in the media;
● recognize the motive of hate toward LGBTI+ people as an aggravating factor in accordance with criminal law and duly investigate such hate crimes;
● guarantee international protection for refugees subject to persecution, including on the basis of SOGI;
● create a legal mechanism for recognizing same-sex relationships (for example, partnerships) to provide same-sex couples with a legal regime that resembles as closely as possible the legal regime for registering heterosexual relationships, including in matters of raising children;
● eliminate legal restrictions for single fathers to use surrogate mothers;
● introduce a statutory ban restricting parental rights or any other interference in the family due to the sexual orientation or gender identity of the parents or the children and ensure legal recognition for same-sex parents;
● stop repressing LGBTI+ organizations and initiatives, deeming them “foreign agents” and forcing them to shut down;
● stop blocking information resources containing LGBTI+ topics;
● revoke the ban on the promotion of non-traditional sexual relations and the ban on children receiving information about LGBTI+ relationships that is appropriate for their age and level of development;
● ensure respect for the family rights of T-people who have made the transition and officially changed a gender marker, including guarantees of inviolability of the registered marriage, recognition and protection of parental rights etc.;
● take concrete steps to de-pathologize transgender people and remove the F.64 diagnosis from regulations that prohibit people with this diagnosis from performing certain types of work.

Joint submission about LGBT+ rights in Russia

April 4, 2023
As a result of the previous UPR cycle in 2018, several recommendations were accepted by Russia (namely, 147.89 — 147.98, 147.123 — 147.129, 147.238). None of them were implemented and the situation worsened for the last 4 years.
This report on the situation with LGBT+ rights in Russia is provided by a coalition of LGBT+ organisations for the 44th UPR session. The following organisations contributed to this report:

"Sphere Foundation" (spherequeer.org) was an NGO based in St. Petersburg, Russia since 2011, through the years having evolved into the biggest Russian LGBT+ foundation. From the onset, Charitable Foundation ‘Sphere’ acted as a fiscal sponsor and implementing body for key LGBT+ rights initiatives across Russia. In April of 2022, it was ruled to dissolve the Foundation following a court process brought on by the Russian Ministry of Justice where the organisation’s activity ‘mainly aimed at LGBT+ people’ was found as allegedly ‘undermining moral foundations of the Russian society’. Sphere’s team has remained intact and maintains its work, preserving and developing programs and activities aimed at supporting the rights of the LGBT+ community throughout Russia.

LGBT-Initiative group "Coming Out" (comingoutspb.com) is a regional nonprofit initiative group founded in 2008 in St. Petersburg, Russia. Coming Out works for universal recognition of human dignity and equal rights of all regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity by lobbying and advocacy, educational and cultural events, and providing psychological and legal services to LGBT+ people.

"ECOM" (Eurasian Coalition for Health, Rights, Gender and Sexual Diversity, ecom.ngo) is an international non-governmental association based in Tallinn, Estonia. We are a membership association open to non-profit organisations and activists working in the field of rights and health of LGBT+ communities in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA) region.

DELO LGBT+ (delo.lgbt) is a human rights association of lawyers and civil activists founded to protect the rights of LGBTI+, intersex, asexual, and polyamorous people and other groups subject to discrimination of the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, or preferred type of relations. The group continues to operate in Russia, and its participants provide the kind of assistance that cannot be provided from abroad, namely, representation in courts and other law enforcement bodies and so forth.
Recommendations
  • Ensure that the rights of LGBT+ people are respected and protected in Russia, including protecting them from discrimination, violence, and hate crimes based on their sexual orientation or gender identity;
  • Create a legal mechanism to ensure that family rights of LGBT+ people are respected;
  • Repeal laws and policies that discriminate against LGBT+ people, including the «LGBT- propaganda» law;
  • Ensure that LGBT+ individuals can exercise their right to freedom of peaceful assembly and expression without fear of retaliation;
  • Ensure that LGBT+ individuals have access to healthcare services without discrimination;
  • Take steps to ensure that LGBT+ individuals have access to legal protections, including anti-discrimination laws, and that they can seek legal remedies for human rights violations;
  • Continue the good practice of sending transgender prisoners to serve their sentence based on their interests and recognise it by law;
  • To revise the guidelines, protocols on HIV and STIs and their adjustment in accordance with the WHO standards;
  • Cancel the rules on the deportation of HIV positive migrants.

A. Equality and non-discrimination
1. Over the past 4 years, the LGBT+ community in Russia has faced increased responsibility for LGBT+ propaganda. Instead of implementing the recommendations of the previous review, the Russian Federation introduces additional discriminatory restrictions for citizens based on their sexual orientation and gender identity.

2. On November 24, 2022, State Duma adopted the law about complete ban of the so-called "LGBT+ propaganda" — not only among minors as it was since 2013, but among all age groups. The penalties in the new law show that the state equates the dissemination of information about LGBT+ people with the distribution of child pornography. The liability provided for under these articles has become identical from the end of 2022.

3. The first goal of this law lies not in the punishment of separate individuals, but rather in the ban on all and any information about LGBT+ on the Internet and inducement of homophobic views of the citizens. In April 2022, Meta and TikTok were fined for propaganda. In May, a lawyer at the LGBT Resource Center in Yekaterinburg was fined twice for posting information on the organisation's website. In July, blogger Yury Dud was fined for a video with the artist Pavlov-Andreevich. In August, the head teacher of a school in Yekaterinburg was brought to administrative responsibility for the dance of graduates.

4. The second goal of this law is to rally citizens around the ideology of "traditional Russian values''. In order to continue the war, an ideology is needed. For Putin, hatred, in particular, of LGBT+ people became such an ideology. The state propaganda machine began to use the hatred against LGBT+ community at the beginning of a Russian full-scale invasion. Federal channels spoke about the participation of representatives of the LGBT+ community in the war on the side of Ukraine as a negative characteristic of the quality of the armed forces. State representatives have started habitually demonising being LGBT+, associating it strictly with Western influence, equating it with an issue of national security.

5. This law is strongly against the principle of individual autonomy secured by the Constitutional Court decisions (see Constitutional Court decision in the case of Alexeyev, Evtushenko and Isakhov №24-П). The freedom of sexual self-identification means the duty of the State not to hinder the person's choice of their sexual behaviour (suggesting such behaviour as nonviolent and non-dangerous for others).

6. According to the law, cases of propaganda should be investigated by the police. However, Sphere Foundation is aware that since 2019, the FSB has been systematically engaged in identifying "propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations" on the Internet. FSB letters started the "propaganda" cases of Aleksey Pavlov from Naberezhnye Chelny, Ekaterina Topchiy and Sergey from Khabarovsk, Yulia Tsvetkova from Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Sphere's lawyers applied to FSB with the question, why they but not the police were in charge of this work. The involvement of the FSB shows us that countering information about LGBT+ is part of high-level government policy.

7. According to Mediazona, a Russian independent media outlet, first seven charges related to the new "LGBT+ propaganda" law were made against trans women sex workers, who are migrants[1]. This shows that intersecting identities increase vulnerability[2]. According to Kyrgyz Indigo’s research, trans women sex workers migrants are struggling with human rights violations in Russia on a daily basis[3]. 83% of them were blackmailed, 74% faced illegal detention and 52% were forced to provide information about their clients to police.

B. Freedom of association
8. In spite of the earlier recommendations, civil society organisations faced unprecedented pressure by the Russian authorities since the 3rd Universal Periodic Review. By the beginning of the full-scale invasion, most of the notorious Russian human rights initiatives and independent media outlets were pushed out of the country or cracked down, their legal entities being liquidated and their managers and employees facing risks of criminal prosecution.

9. The main tool used to silence Russian civil society has been ‘foreign agents’ legislation, introduced in 2012. It was drastically widened and harshened[4] at the end of 2020. Since then, the law targeted not only NGOs, independent media outlets, and ‘individual-media foreign agents’ but also non-registered entities as well as administrators, employees or members of all the above-mentioned entities. In case of individuals, a criteria of foreign funding was lifted, so ‘any form of support from abroad’ qualified a person to be labelled. Four different registers were introduced for each type of ‘foreign agents’. Evidently, the variety of the lists led to the amount of paperwork overwhelming even for the Ministry of Justice. Thus, in 2022 another bill was introduced, further widening the scope of repressions and as well as composing a united list of foreign agents[5].

10. As of March 2023, the list contained 559 ‘foreign agents’ of which 252 individuals. The list includes the main Russian federal and region LGBT+ organisations as well as vocal LGBT+ activists. Among them are Coming Out, Sphere Foundation, Russian LGBT Network, Moscow Community Center, Action, T*-Action, Irida, Revers, Majak, Resource LGBT Center, Federation of LGBT Sport, T9 NSK, Igor Kochetkov, Mariya Sabunaeva, Kirill Fedorov, Sasha Kazantseva, Regina Dzugkoeva, Karen Shahinyan, Yaroslav Sirotkin.

11. The list does not include any motivation for the designation of a foreign agent except for a reference to a respective provision of the law. Therefore, the main way to learn the reasoning behind an arbitrary decision is to file a complaint. One of the reasons for several persons even who are not LGBT+ activists is ‘LGBT propaganda’ (or ‘propaganda of non-traditional relationships’). Among such people are Elizaveta Gyrdymova (singer Monetochka), Daria Serenko (co-founder of Feminist Anti-War Resistance), Moscow regional deputy Darya Besedina.

12. For an attorney at law Mikhail Benyash, the reasoning was his official remuneration from human rights organisations, including Human Rights Centre Memorial and Sphere Foundation. In February 2023, Benyash was disbarred by the rule of the Krasnodar Bar Association.

13. Designation as a ‘foreign agent’ causes both formal and informal discrimination for respective individuals and entities. All the individuals in the list are subjected to severe limitations in terms of their professional activities. Excessive reporting obligations consider every ‘foreign agent’. The Code on Administrative Offences and the Criminal Code were amended simultaneously in 2020, causing unbearable fines for organisations and individuals and criminal liability for up to 5 years of imprisonment for individuals for violations of the foreign agents legislation. Informal intimidation included the intensified smear campaign in state-related media and attacks on the work and private spaces of those designated as ‘foreign agents’.

14. The informal consequence of designation as a ‘foreign agent’ is becoming a target for a smear campaign. State-related media and public officials such as the State Duma deputies regularly mention human rights defenders, journalists and activists using such terms as ‘traitors’. Media outlets associated with Evgeniy Prigozhin, a notorious owner of the ‘Vagner’s PMC", had been publishing ‘investigations’ based on various NGOs’ public reports calling to designate human rights initiatives and independent media ‘foreign agents’ and ‘undesirable organisations’ months and sometimes weeks prior to the designation of a respective initiative. The LGBT+ rights initiatives and activists faced numerous public accusations in ‘propaganda’ and ‘manipulations with fragile children’s psyche’.

15. The use of the law on undesirable organisations has also been widened. Since 2015, the label ‘undesirable organisations’ has been applied to foreign NGOs and media outlets. According to the Russian authorities, their activities ‘threaten the foundations of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation, the defence capability of the country, or the security of the state’.

16. ‘Undesirable organisations’ are prohibited from conducting any activities on the territory of the Russian Federation under the risk of administrative and criminal liability for the employees and founders. Russian citizens are also prohibited from participating in such organisations’ activities abroad. Participation in an "undesirable organisation" is punishable by a fine of up to 100,000 rubles. If a person has previously been held administratively liable, engagement in an "undesirable organisation" becomes a criminal act and can be punished with up to 5 years imprisonment.

17. Since 2022, the prosecutor's office has been investigating Alesandr Voronov, the CEO of the LGBT-initiative group Coming Out, for cooperation with an ‘undesirable organisation’. The reason was a brochure about LGBT+ parents, published jointly with The Heinrich Böll Foundation, which was recognized in Russia as an ‘undesirable organisation’. The brochure was published in 2009, when Voronov was not yet a director and the Bell Foundation was not an ‘undesirable organisation’ (it was recognized as such in 2022). This case shows how collaboration between NGOs can be dangerous and prosecuted if one of them is deemed undesirable. In addition, this case demonstrates that cooperation with "undesirable organisations" has no statute of limitations and can become a reason for persecution at any time.

18. As of 10 March 2023, the registry of undesirable organisations consisted of 78 organisations. Among them, there are international donor institutions, human rights organisations, independent media, political entities, research organisations, educational entities, socio-educational initiatives and projects, etc.

19. Further risks were introduced for the remains of Russian civil society in February 2022 with the ‘war censorship’ legislation effectively prohibiting any public assessment of the actions of the state military forces and the government in terms of the invasion.

20. In December 2022, the repressive legislation was complemented by signing into force amendments to the law on ‘propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations’, pushing all the LGBT+ rights organisations and initiatives out of the legal field. According to the current version of the law, the ‘spread of information or public actions in order to <…> create a distorted perception of traditional and non-traditional relationships’ equal value’ if made online and affecting minors leads to the same consequences for a legal entity as production and distribution of child pornography. Thus, for LGBT+ rights initiatives any public activity may lead to a 5 million RUB fine and 3 month suspended operations.

21. Should the civil society organisation survive the above mentioned measures and continue its operations in the country, the authorities take the extreme measures, namely the liquidation of a legal entity and criminal prosecution of individuals involved in its operations. The most notorious cases of such measures are the liquidation of the Memorial and the Moscow Helsinki Group[6].

22. In February 2022, the Ministry of Justice filed a lawsuit against the Sphere Foundation which was supporting LGBT+ persons in Russia.[7] According to the state position, the constitution of the country enshrines ‘basic traditional family values’, and the foundation’s work is aimed at ‘changing the legislation and moral foundations in the Russian Federation’. In April 2022, the Kuibyshev District Court of St. Petersburg issued a decision to liquidate the Sphere Foundation.

C. Rights of prisoners
23. The Russian Penitentiary legislation as well as the Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) does not have any specific guidelines or procedures for transgender prisoners. The main strategy the administration of penitentiary facilities uses in cases of transgender persons is solitary cells. This practice is punitive, coses a serious risk for mental health and is considered as humiliation of human dignity. Solitary cells make resocialization for transgender persons even more challenging after their sentence is finished. Moreover, solitary confinement may become a nearly permanent solution throughout a transgender person’s sentence, as it happened with Nazar Gulevich.

24. Nazar Gulevich is a transgender man, Belarusian citizen, who was detained in the Moscow region in August 2018 under suspicion of fraud. He was sentenced to 4,5 years in the standard regime penal colony. Later, the Moscow City Court ruled to reduce his sentence to 4 years. More than a half of Nazar’s sentence was spent in the solitary cell in the pre-trial detention centre with little to no human contact, and near to no time spent outside his cell.

25. The facility’s administration argued that solitary confinement was the only measure available to ensure safety of a transgender man in a female detention centre. After the verdict on Gulevich’s case came into force, he had to spend 3 months in prison from 4 appointed years. To serve such a short term of imprisonment, a prisoner is allowed to remain in a pre-trial detention centre. However, instead of this, he was sent for 3 months between male colonies, where each time he was kept in solitary confinement. After the release, Gulevich was deported to Belarus due to the ban on the presence on the territory of the Russian Federation of foreign citizens who were previously prosecuted in Russia. This was another additional punishment in the case of Nazar Gulevich

26. Despite the claims on the lack of alternative measures to ensure safety of a transgender prisoners in a penitentiary facility, there is a case representing the opposite. Innokenty Alimov, also a transgender man, was sentenced to 4,5 years in the standard regime penal colony in February 2021. First two months of his term Alimov spent in the solitary cell in a female pre-trial detention centre. After his attorney’s intervention, Alimov was transferred to the medical unit of the facility and later was allowed to remain in a pre-trial detention centre. In October 2022, Alimov was transferred to a female penal colony upon his official request.

27. These two cases demonstrate a certain willingness of the Russian penitentiary system to not only formally ensure safety of prisoners by keeping them in isolation, but also make further steps. Unfortunately, the solution remains to depend on the administration of the detention centre. The same applies to the medical examination of transgender persons in the penitentiary facilities, their access to gender-affirmative hormonal therapy, and other specific needs.

D. Digital rights
28. The ultimate goal of the "propaganda law" lies not in the punishment of separate individuals, but rather in the ban on all and any information about LGBT+ on the Internet and inducement of homophobic views of the citizens. In recent years, organisations such as the Sphere Foundation, the Russian LGBT Network, Prini Plus, Coming out, the Resource Center for LGBT in Yekaterinburg, Rainbow World from Perm, Mayak from Vladivostok and others have faced blocking of their sites.

29. The new law on "propaganda" makes it possible to block sites despite the presence of age verification on entry. Previously, the question "Are you over 18 years old?" saved many LGBT+ sites from blocking.

30. The authority responsible for blocking of LGBT+ content is Rosmolodezh. Since 2019 this agency has the authority to block websites on the Internet without a court decision.

E. Protection from violence
31. The problem of "fake dates" is still a great challenge for the Russian LGBT+ community. "Fake dates" is a type of hate-crimes against LGBT+ community (topical mostly for cisgender gay or bisexual men and transgender women). In these crimes the criminals call their victim to the "date". After this they demand money/some actions with the threats of using violence and outing. Russian courts and law enforcement agencies don't consider such crimes as hate-crimes. The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation has some provisions against hate-crimes (see Art. 63 of the Russian Criminal Code). Anyway, the criminals get their punishment because of "ordinary" robbery, extortion etc. It happens even in the cases where accused openly declare their homophobic motive. Such crimes hurt the most vulnerable groups such as migrants and people from Caucasian parts of Russia.

32. The "fake dates" crimes are possible because of stigmatisation of LGBT+ people in Russian society. Homophobic policy provided by the Russian Government is also a cause of such crimes.The fear of outing and possible problems because of "bad" sexual orientation make LGBT+ people "easy victims".

F. Family rights
33. Russia recognizes only one form of registered relationships - heterosexual marriage. It leads to the situation when partners in same-sex relationships have no possibilities to get rights that usually spouses have (right not to testify against a spouse, right to take part in social programmes for young families, right to to an inheritance under the law, right to tax deductions; the right to visit a spouse in the ICU; the right of a foreign-born spouse to not be deported from Russia etc.). This position found support in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) case Fedotova and Others v. Russia. The Court found the right of the applicants to respect their private and family life was violated.

34. The new court practice causes concern. Since 2022 courts have started to invalidate marriages where one of the spouses is a transgender person. According to the court's decisions, marriage considered as a union of a man and a woman and "same-sex" marriages are against Russian traditions and foundations of the state.

35. At the same time in the Russian legislation "sex change by one of the spouses" doesn’t exist among the grounds for invalidating a marriage.

36. Russia does not recognize legal situations where a child can have same-sex parents. Moreover, Family Code of Russia prohibits people in same-sex marriages and people who are citizens of a country that allows same-sex marriage and are unmarried from adopting children (Art. 127(1)(13) of the Russian Family Code). Such people also cannot be foster parents (guardians) for a child (Art. 146(1) of the Family Code).

37. Such nonrecognition leads to legal insecurity of LGBT+ families. It also leads to discrimination of the "second" parent (the biological parent’s partner) in LGBT+ unions. Such people (who are de-facto parents) have no possibility to use parents rights such as the right to raise a child together; the right to demand that a child be returned from a person who is wrongfully keeping that child; the right to advocate for the child’s interests in relationships with other people and represent the child’s interests, etc.

G. Right to health
38. Gay, bisexual men and trans people are the key population. Due to the "LGBT propaganda" law, "foreign agents" communities are excluded from publicly funded HIV prevention programs and do not have access to foreign funds. Both of these laws prevent the creation of low-threshold assistance services.

39. Russia is the only country in the EECA region, where PREP (pre-exposure prophylaxis) is completely absent. It shows that one of the most effective HIV prevention methods is not available to key populations, including LGBT+. Inability to test for STIs through rectal and oropharyngeal swabs limits access to STI prevention and treatment among people who practise anal and oral sex.

40. The existing system of epidemic surveillance obliges doctors of public institutions to report personal data each person tested and received positive for syphilis, gonorrhoea and chlamydia. According to the regulations, employees of the epidemiological service should call and call a person for additional examination, or send a notification with a request to appear. These discriminatory practices call into question the issue of data retention, leading to the risk of disclosure of information about health and sexual orientation and gender identity.

41. Due to legislation, HIV positive migrants could face deportation in spite of the fact that such legal provisions do nothing to prevent the spread of the virus, but only make people afraid to get tested and get necessary treatment.

Report on non-implementation of previous UPR cycles' recommendations
A joint submission by civil society organisations
Submitting organizations:
1. OVD-Info — leading Russian human rights project, focusing on monitoring political prosecutions and violations of basic political rights, as well as helping the victims of such violations.
2. Movement of conscientious objectors (MCO) — non-profit organization since 2014 helping young people to legally exempt themselves from conscription to the army. MCO develops materials for recruits, provides consultations and collects information about the conscription.
3. The Movement for Defence of Voters' Rights Golos — a leading Russian organization for public observation of elections.
4. Mass Media Defence Centre — a Russia based media freedom NGO, promoting freedom of expression since 1996. MMDC is providing legal assistance and court defense on domestic and international levels to Russian media, journalists, bloggers.
5. FIDH (International Federation for Human Rights) — an international human rights NGO federating 188 organizations from 116 countries. Since 1922, FIDH has been defending all civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
6. Transparency International-R — an NGO working to counteract corruption and uphold the principles of transparency, accountability, integrity and honesty.
7. Roskomsvoboda — the first Russian public organization active in the field of protecting digital rights and expanding digital opportunities.
8. Sphere — a human rights organization bringing systemic changes to the daily realities of the Russian LGBT community.
9. Coming Out — a regional nonprofit initiative group founded in 2008 in St. Petersburg, working for universal recognition of human dignity and equal rights of all regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity by lobbying and advocacy, educational and cultural events, and providing psychological and legal services to LGBT* people.
10. Citizens Watch — a St. Petersburg based human rights NGO established in 1992 by a group of Russian human rights activists, lawyers and journalists. The goals were to establish parliamentary and civic control over police, security service, and armed forces, and to help prevent violations of constitutional rights by these governmental agencies.
11. Delo LGBT — a Russian LGBTQt rights organization working to provide legal aid for the LGBTQ community to help form a culture of protecting their rights and interests.
12. Moscow Helsinki Group — the eldest existing human rights organization in Russia, founded in 1976. The mission of the Moscow Helsinki Group is to promote respect for human rights, protect from human rights abuses, build and develop democratic institutions in Russia. To achieve this goal MHG conducts constant monitoring and documentation of human rights violations, provides expert analysis for the Government and civil society, organises public campaigns and participates in legislative processes.
13. Free Buryatia Foundation — an advocacy group focused on the Russian federal subject of Buryatia and solving the problem of racism and xenophobia in Russia.
14. European Prison Litigation Network (EPLN) — a network of 25 national NGOs and bar associations from 18 CoE Member States. EPLN’s aim is to enhance the judicial protection of the fundamental rights of prisoners. EPLN holds a participatory status with the Council of Europe.
15. Public Verdict — a Russian human rights organization that combines legal protection for victims of law enforcement arbitrariness with in-depth law enforcement research and professional media support for human rights work.
16. Equality Now — global network of lawyers, activists, and supporters who hold governments responsible for their international obligation to prohibit all forms of violence and discrimination against women.
17. The Consortium of Women’s Non-Governmental Associations — the only organization in Russia that provides legal support for victims of domestic violence throughout the country. The organization contributed solely for the part titled «Violence against women».
18. Stichting Justice Initiative Project — organization dedicated to the legal protection of victims of human rights violations connected to armed conflict and counter-terrorism operations, torture and gender-based violence in the post-Soviet region.
19. The regional non-governmental non-profit organization «Independent Charity Center for Survivors of Sexual Violence “Sisters“ — the organization that provides free, anonymous psychological assistance to all survivors of sexualized violence and their loved ones. The organization contributed solely for the part titled “Violence against women“.
20. Human Rights House Foundation — a coalition of civil society organisations that advocate for the fundamental freedoms of assembly, association, and expression, and the right to be a human rights defender.
Executive Summary
The submitting organizations welcome the opportunity to contribute to the fourth cycle of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of Russia. This submission focuses on implementation of the recommendations about basic political rights and freedoms accepted by Russia since the consideration of Russia’s third periodic report in May 2018 and Russia’s compliance with its obligations.

Recommendations
Below are all the recommendations made by the authors of this submission. Details for each recommendation may be found in the relevant section.

Torture and ill-treatment
  • Criminalise torture as a separate criminal offence compliant with the UN Convention definition and not subject to the statute of limitations;
  • Place prison medical service under the authority of the Ministry of Health and ensure full independence of prison medics from the penitentiary administrations;
  • Ensure immediate and automatic opening of criminal cases in relation to all prima facie allegations of torture;
  • Ensure that the rights of people with disabilities are respected and protected in places of detention;
  • Consider the implementation of alternatives to detention for people with disabilities.

Free expression
  • Amend the Constitution of the Russian Federation to remove references to «historical truth»;
  • Repeal the «Exoneration of Nazism» law and other laws that penalize the expression of opinions about historical facts;
  • Ensure that anti-terrorism and anti-extremism laws are narrowly interpreted in practice, and are not used to prosecute the expression of opinions about historical facts or the interpretation of historical events;
  • Amend the laws targeting Nazi symbols and attributes so that their use is proscribed only in cases where it amounts to propaganda of Nazi ideology;
  • Terminate pending criminal cases concerning expression of opinions about historical facts; review completed criminal cases concerning expression of opinions about historical facts;
  • Review and bring into line with the Constitution and international treaties the practices and restricting laws adopted in the last decade that impede the normal work of journalists;
  • Unblock all media resources and outlets, access to which is now restricted;
  • Stop persecuting journalists for their professional activities;
  • Allow Russian citizens to receive information from various sources, including not state-owned;
  • Ensure the safety of journalists to work in their own country.

Digital rights
  • Ensure that its laws and practices do not restrict freedom of expression and access to information online;
  • Protect online journalists and bloggers from harassment and intimidation, and ensure that they are not prosecuted for expressing their opinions online;
  • Ensure that individuals have the right to privacy online, and that any surveillance activities are carried out in accordance with international human rights standards;
  • Eliminate any laws, regulations, or practices that result in the censorship of online content or the blocking of websites;
  • Promote digital literacy and ensure that individuals have the necessary skills and knowledge to make informed decisions about their online activities;
  • Protect human rights defenders working on digital rights issues from harassment, intimidation, and violence.

Equality and non-discrimination
  • Ensure that the rights of LGBT people are respected and protected in Russia, including protecting them from discrimination, violence, and hate crimes based on their sexual orientation or gender identity;
  • Create a legal mechanism to ensure that family rights of LGBT people are respected;
  • Repeal laws and policies that discriminate against LGBT people, including the «LGBT- propaganda» law;
  • Ensure that LGBT individuals can exercise their right to freedom of peaceful assembly and expression without fear of retaliation;
  • Ensure that LGBT individuals have access to healthcare services without discrimination;
  • Take steps to ensure that LGBT individuals have access to legal protections, including anti-discrimination laws, and that they can seek legal remedies for human rights violations.

Racial and ethnic discrimination
  • Stop the practise of racial profiling, train the police officers on the rights of migrants and minorities;
  • Adopt legislative guarantees on protection of privacy while using technologies including artificial intelligence in law enforcement and ensure their application in practice;
  • Take concrete steps to eliminate discrimination against ethnic and racial minorities;
  • Implement and enforce effective anti-discrimination laws and policies that ensure equal access to education, employment, housing, and other basic services;
  • Take steps to prevent and punish hate crimes against ethnic and racial minorities;
  • Strengthen the legal framework to address hate crimes and ensure that law enforcement agencies are trained to respond effectively to such incidents;
  • Promote cultural diversity and tolerance by supporting the preservation and promotion of the cultural heritage of ethnic and racial minorities;
  • Ensure equal political representation of ethnic and racial minorities in all levels of government;
  • Engage in constructive dialogue with representatives of ethnic and racial minorities, civil society organizations, and international human rights bodies.

Religion and belief
  • Ensure the right of religious groups to fully practice their religion or belief without fear of persecution;
  • Release all unjustly persecuted Jehovah’s Witnesses;
  • Define precisely the crime of extremism and apply it only in relevant cases in full compliance with international obligations.

Association and assembly
  • Take measures to ensure that civil society organizations are able to operate independently without fear of harassment or interference from the authorities;
  • Revise or repeal legislation that hinders the freedom of association, including the laws on «foreign agents», «undesirable organizations» and «extremism»;
  • Release all people unjustly persecuted for exercising their freedom of association and ensure the effective investigation of such human rights violations;
  • Repeal the decisions to liquidate prominent civil society organizations and ensure that registration and liquidation processes are transparent and non-discriminatory, and should not be subject to arbitrary or politicized decision-making;
  • Ensure that spontaneous events and events with few participants may be held without prior notifications of the authorities;
  • Exclude the possibility of criminal liability and administrative arrests for repeated participation in non-approved peaceful assemblies;
  • Substantially reduce fines for violation of the rules concerning public assemblies;
  • Reform system of approval of public assemblies, so as to make it more flexible and favorable to organizers;
  • Remove local laws that prohibit solo demonstration due to the pandemic;
  • Stop the practice of preventive detentions and post-factum detentions with the use of facial recognition systems;
  • Avoid from using excessive force against protesters and effectively investigate the cases of police violence;
  • Stop detentions and prosecutions for participation and organizations of anti-war public events, acquit and release prosecuted anti-war activists;
  • Repeal the laws prohibiting «discrediting» and «spreading fakes» about the use of Russian armed forces.

Participation in public and political life
  • Ensure that all elections are conducted freely and fairly, and that all citizens are able to participate in the electoral process without fear of intimidation or discrimination;
  • Ensure that opposition candidates have equal access to media coverage and campaign financing, and are not subject to arbitrary detention or harassment;
  • Ensure the independence of the Central Election Commission and regional election commissions to prevent political interference and ensure impartiality;
  • Strengthen the legal framework for elections, including the Electoral Code and other relevant laws, to ensure that they conform to international standards and best practices.

Violence against women
  • Adopt comprehensive legislation to prevent and address domestic violence and ensure that it criminalises all forms of domestic violence, including physical, sexual, economic and psychological in accordance with international and regional standards, in particular General Recommendations of the CEDAW Committee Nos. 19, 33 and 35 and the Istanbul Convention.
  • Amend the definitions of rape and other acts of sexual nature (CC Articles 131-133), in order for these definitions to be based on free, genuine and voluntary consent, in the context of the surrounding circumstances and include a wide range of coercive circumstances where consent cannot be considered to have been given, in accordance with international human rights standards. Ensure that force is not a required element of the crime of rape but rather an aggravating factor;
  • Address the issue of harmful practices in the North Caucasus region, through extensive work with local elites, the judiciary and law enforcement. Eliminate loopholes in the criminal law that prevent prosecution in cases of abduction of both women and girls, adopt a law banning FGM, eliminate the use of mitigating circumstances in cases of «honor killings».
Due process
  • Ensure that the courts at all times observe the principle of a public hearing and undertake compensatory measures if the circumstances require limitations of the principle;
  • Ensure that the defendant and their lawyer are provided with conditions enabling confidential negotiations, and defense lawyers always able to enjoy their professional rights even in case of adoption of anti-pandemic measures.

People with disabilities
  • Adopt a human rights model of disability, stop using term «invalidi» in official documents and discourse,
  • Promote the possibilities of persons with disabilities to live independently and participate in the life of society including the choice of supported decision-making;
  • Involuntary hospitalization and treatment should not be used to pressure activists and human rights defenders; physical restraint should be used in accordance with international standards; conditions in places of detention should meet the needs of persons with disabilities.

Corruption
  • Ensure public access to polls on corruption perception and engagement, including regionally disaggregated;
  • Redevelop judicial IT systems to ensure easy and free access to all court dockets and rulings, as well as court hearings;
  • Develop a national strategy on open government and public info access;
  • Design a body in charge of public information access;
  • Promote civic participation in judicial councils.

Enforced disappearances
  • Create an ad hoc humanitarian body to search for missing persons using modern scientific knowledge in a procedure complementary to investigations;
  • Urgently address the problem of abductions in Chechnya, provide information, including available statistics, on recent complaints about kidnappings involving state agents in the region and their investigation;
  • Cease the practice of enforced disappearances of Belarusian citizens residing in Russia on political grounds, and ensure that all individuals are afforded due process and protection under the law;
  • Investigate and prosecute any officials or individuals who engage in or facilitate enforced disappearances.

Human rights obligations
  • Ensure the implementation of all ECtHR decisions and interim measures of UN HRC and recommendations of all other relevant international mechanisms;
  • Repeal the legislation non-compliant with international obligations.

Military service
  • End the practice of forced conscription and ensure that individuals have the right to choose whether or not to perform military service;
  • Ensure that conscripts have access to legal assistance and can challenge decisions related to their military service.

Torture and ill-treatment
Torture in prisons
The informal merger of the operative services of the Federal Penitentiary Service (the FSIN) and investigative agencies contributes significantly to the violence in the Russian prisons. As a result of this merger of services that are fundamentally different in nature, the prisons are controlling and manipulating the investigation. Prison services’ operatives suppress or eliminate testimonies of prisoners, extract confessions, and force inmates to cooperate with investigative and law-enforcement services.

A characteristic feature of the atrocities against prisoners in Russia is the active recruitment of «enforcers» from among other prisoners by the prison administration and law-enforcement agencies.
Another decisive factor of impunity for torture in Russian prisons is the subordination of the medical staff of prisons to the FSIN, which results in the absence of recording of torture-related injuries and the systemic failure to alert the external authorities about the situation in prisons.

The authorities are taking no measures to support the Public Monitoring Commissions, independent bodies monitoring the places of detention. «Inconvenient» members of PMCs are being replaced with former law-enforcement officers. In 2019-2021 the PMCs and legal counsels were prohibited from freely using audio- and video-equipment during prison visits. Prison staff on the other hand was allowed to check any documents and records and determine their «relevance to the protection of the rights of the detainees», and interrupt interviews with prisoners.

Despite the repeated recommendations from the UN CAT and the CSOs, the Russian authorities are reluctant to criminalise torture as a separate criminal offence, thus failing to create a basic legal framework necessary for effective investigation of torture and prosecution of those responsible. According to the information of the Russian Government, in 2018, 2,680 criminal complaints of torture and ill-treatment led only to 64 opened criminal cases against prison staff. There is no detailed domestic protocol for the investigation of torture-related cases.

Effective investigation of torture
In Russia, instances of torture and ill-treatment reported by human rights organizations often occur in isolated environments where victims have no outside contact. This makes survivors of torture vulnerable, particularly in formal proceedings where they confront their perpetrators who often have full control over evidence. Victims may face pressure to discourage them from filing a formal complaint, and no state rehabilitation programs are available for survivors of torture to help them with official proceedings. While victims can file complaints using official channels, subsequent proceedings are often inaccessible, and investigations into torture reports are limited.

Fundamental standards of effective investigation are violated, as complaints of torture are often not registered or investigated in a timely manner, leading to the loss of critical evidence. Criminal charges have sometimes been brought against those who report torture, which is intended to pressure victims to discourage them from complaining and seeking a remedy. Ineffective investigation of torture complaints is a key contributor to the practice of bringing retaliatory false denunciation charges against torture victims. This practice could establish criminal charges against torture victims as a standard method to discourage people from exercising their right to file a complaint.

People with disabilities in places of detention
In general, condition of detention in Russia are often inconsistent with international law prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, major judgements of the ECtHR on the topic has not been implemented since 2002, in particular, there are no effective preventive and compensatory remedies.

In April 2021, Conception on the Development of the Penal and Correctional System until 2030 was approved, which provides for improving the conditions of detention for persons with disabilities and creating an accessible environment. However, no specific actions to implement its provisions were adopted.

In practice, persons with disabilities face various obstacles in places of detention. People deprived of their liberty also often complain about the prolonged failure to send them to a medical and social expert evaluation for the purpose of establishing a disability or re-certifying them. Because of this, they cannot receive the necessary treatment and/or are deprived of social payments for disability.

A prisoner cannot always be assured of release due to illness, as courts check whether the illness meets the severity of the course and degree of functional impairment provided by the specific list. If in their opinion it does not, then no release occurs. Second, the courts assess not only whether the illness prevents a prisoner from serving his sentence, but also other factors that should not be considered under the law, such as whether the illness was acquired before the conviction. Judges also take into account the existence of penalties; the likelihood that release will «significantly improve the health» of the person; «the behavior of the convicted person, his attitude toward the treatment conducted, his compliance with medical recommendations, the regime requirements of the penitentiary institution, as well as data about the personality of the convicted person, the availability of a permanent residence, relatives or close persons who can and agree to care for him.

Free expression
The overall trend of the recent legislative developments in the Russian Federation can be summarized as an on-going encroachment on the freedom of speech, right to seek and access information freely.
In 2018 UPR, it was recommended to amend legislation related to amending anti-extremist legislation, ‘ideology of terrorism’, ‘degrading human dignity’ on various bases, and ‘calls aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation’. However, these whole body of laws have been expanded in their scope recently. Such expansion of their scope is characterized by their arbitrary enforcement quite often relying on extrajudicial measures and vague wording.

These laws get enforced in quite unpredictable and unbalanced manner. For example, at least 47 people planning to run for municipal office in Moscow in 2022 were prosecuted for «distributing extremist content», mainly for posting symbols of Navalny’s organizations. Such prosecution blocks the passive electoral right for the persecuted person for 2 years.

Online commenting on news about Mikhail Zhlobitsky caused several shockingly severe criminal sentences. For instance, the cases of Ivan Lyubshin and Pavel Bondarenko, who were sentenced for 5 years and 2 months and 6 years in common regime colonies respectively. Overall, as of March 2023, 50 criminal cases for «justifying terrorism» are initiated in connection with publications about this explosion.
Besides, the Article 148.1 of the Criminal Code on ‘insulting religious feelings’ mentioned in the preceding UPR was not repealed. The same is true for the defamation (both slander and libel), namely Articles 128.1, 298.1 and 319 of the Criminal Code, was not even partially decriminalized.

Independent media and journalists
From 2019 to 2023, the independent Russian media community was subjected to a large number of repressions from the Russian authorities. None of the previous recommendations (namely, 147.127, 147.150, 147.159, 147.163, 147.166 — 147.174) were implemented.

The number of laws restricting the work of journalists and media increased: the law on foreign agents, on undesirable organizations, on «sovereign Runet», on «fake news» and «disrespecting the authorities» increased the list of grounds for content restrictions, including extrajudicial blocking of websites.

According to the amendments to the Law on Mass Media adopted in July 2022 the General Prosecutor’s office received the right to demand the suspension of the work of Russian media without any prior court decision. Same could be applied to bureaus of foreign media accredited in Russia: closure of foreign media bureau, withdrawal of accreditation, blocking of website for life and without the right to challenge this decision of governmental body in the court of law.

During these years some journalists and bloggers were convicted for articles of «extremism» and «justification of terrorism», Ivan Safronov, former journalist of Kommersant, was imprisoned for 22 years being accused of treason. Since February 24, 2022, more than 30 journalists have had criminal cases of military fake news initiated against them.

Freedom of speech after full-scale invasion in Ukraine
The ongoing military conflict with Ukraine, spurred manifold federal laws aimed at further suppression of freedom of speech.

Amendments to the Criminal Code (hereinafter — CC) and Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter — CAO) were enacted. The former cover «public acts aimed at discreditation of» and «dissemination of deliberately false information about» the Armed Forces’ operations and activity of the Russian governmental authorities abroad. In particular, Articles 207.3 and 280.3 of the CC prescribe from 3 up to 15 years of imprisonment. As of March 20, 2023, there are 144 people criminally prosecuted for «fakes» and 57 — for «discreditation» of Russian Armed Forces. Plus, almost 6000 people were fined for minor offence under the Article 20.3.3 of CAO (discreditation of Russian Armed Forces), the second fine under this Article is a criminal offence under Article 280.3.

On February 24, 2022 Roskomnadzor basically introduced military censorship. Subsequently Roskomnadzor blocked the websites of all existing independent media outlets — over 250 of them have been blocked for covering the war in Ukraine. Emerging media projects also get blocked swiftly. Over 700 Russian journalists had to relocate from Russia to continue their work safely. 4 media outlets and 82 journalists have been recognized as foreign agents since February 24, 2022, imposing on them a whole range of limitations and bans, stigmatising them in the public domain. Five online media have been listed as undesirable organizations.

Overall, since February 24th, 2022, by March 20th, 2023, there are at least 481 people criminally prosecuted for anti-war stance. 119 people have already been sentenced, 31 of them are currently serving prison sentences. The longest sentences are — 8,5 years to opposition politician Ilya Yashin and leader of student protest organization in MSU Dmitry Ivanov, 7 years to independent municipal deputy Alexey Gorinov, 6 years to independent journalist Maria Ponomarenko. Cases under article 207.3 against people who left the country began to be considered in courts in absentia (a very rare occurrence in Russia).

Historical speech
Russia’s crackdown on freedom of expression has particularly targeted historical speech. Since the previous UPR cycle, the authorities have adopted at least seven «memory laws» restricting public expression of certain interpretations of historical events, particularly surrounding the Soviet period and the Second World War. In addition to stifling scholarly debate on important historical issues, and promoting historical revisionism, these laws have been used to persecute human rights defenders and CSOs working on commemorating victims of Soviet-era atrocities, as well as to foment propaganda justifying Russia’s aggression and other international crimes committed in Ukraine under the guise of «denazification.»

Russia’s most notorious «memory law» is Article 354.1 of the CC, which, at the time of its adoption in 2014, prohibited among others the approval or denial of Nazi crimes, as established by the Nuremberg Tribunal, and the «dissemination of knowingly false information about the activities of the USSR during the Second World War.»

This law has been expanded after the adoption of the 2020 amendments to the Constitution. The Constitution cemented the official historical narrative of the Soviet past, namely that the Russian Federation is the «successor» of the Soviet Union, that it «honours the memory of defenders of the Homeland» — an obvious reference to the Great Patriotic War — and «protects historical truth». The Constitution also prohibited «diminishing the significance of the people’s heroism in defending the Homeland.»

Since then, several more «memory laws» have been adopted. An amendment to Article 354.1 criminalized «the public dissemination of knowingly false information regarding the veterans of the Great Patriotic War» and insults of the „memory of the defenders of the Homeland or degrading the honour and dignity of the veterans of the Great Patriotic War.“ Another law, adopted on 16 April 2022, prohibited the public comparisons of the „goals, decisions and actions“ of the leadership of the USSR with those of Nazi Germany, as well as the denial of the „decisive role of the Soviet people in the defeat of Nazi Germany and the humanitarian mission of the USSR during the liberation of European countries.“

These amendments have practically outlawed any discussion of crimes committed by the Soviet Union during the Second World War and allowed the State to prosecute those who disclose the truth about or question these policies.

To date, 125 cases have been initiated under Article 354.1 of the Criminal Code, most of which have resulted in convictions, including for historically accurate statements regarding the Soviet Union’s period of collaboration with Nazi Germany during the Second World War.

In March 2023, Russia’s Investigative Committee opened a criminal investigation against employees of Nobel prize-winning NGO Memorial on the basis of this Article for the fact that three alleged Nazi criminals were included in the database of victims of Stalinist repression, which the organization compiles and which contains almost four million names. The offices of Memorial and the homes of all Memorial staff remaining in Russia were searched, without court authorisation, in connection with the case.

The authorities also make extensive use of Article 13.15(4) of the CAO, to prosecute opposition activists. In 2022, politician Leonid Gozman served 30 days of arrest in total under this article, for his Facebook posts from 2020 and 2013, in violation of the prohibition of non-retroactive application of the law.

Russia’s «memory laws» serve no legitimate public purpose. They are used to suppress historical expression related to the Soviet past, which undermines the state-sponsored historical narrative. Domestically, their enforcement has impeded the work of local NGOs and activists that advance justice and reparations for victims of Stalinist and other Soviet-era atrocities. Internationally, these laws, and the rhetoric they help to amplify, have also facilitated Russia’s aggression by perpetuating a false rhetorical equivalency between the war Russia now wages in Ukraine and the Soviet Union’s drive to liberate European territories occupied by Nazi Germany.
Digital rights
Recommendations of the preceding 2018 UPR regarding digital rights (namely, 147.65, 147.67, 147.153, 147.167 and others) were not respected. The so-called «Yarovaya package», was not repealed, the SORM Programme was not reformed. Moreover, Roskomnadzor pursues the enforcement of the «Yarovaya package» by putting new organizations into relevant registry thus forcing them to comply with data retention requirements.

All the mentioned problematic legislative developments are applied both online and offline. Moreover, in certain cases online speech is punishable by more severe sanctions. At least a couple of episodes when the government agency, Roskomnadzor, attempted to control traffic of Twitter and Youtube websites and services are known.

Roskomnadzor continues to restrict access to and use of VPN, Tor and other Internet anonymizers in order to impair the ability of the Russian citizens to access information. As the case of the Tor showed, Roskomnadzor does not need new legislation for that. In December 2021 the Tor Project website and the Tor Browser got blocked upon the court decision of 2017. Neither the existence of special procedure, nor the position of the ECHR expressed in case of Engels v. Russia, on unacceptance of putting any type of ban on anonymizing technology tools, convinced the Russian judges not to rule for the Tor Project access restriction in Russia.

Recent legal developments also touched upon the issue of genomic data processing. The Federal Assembly enacted a bill requiring mandatory genetic registration of the convicted who are imprisoned, suspects or accused of crimes and of those who were subject to administrative arrest. It is noteworthy, a number of administrative arrests are imposed on those who exercise their freedom of speech and assembly. The mandatory genomic registration or any processing of their sensitive data cause concerns about the ulterior motives behind such registration and processing as by any international and European legal standards of data protection shall be deemed excessive.

Moreover, the practice of mass blocking of online resources persisted. In 2022 alone, more than 210,000 web resources were blocked, 10,000 of them under the «military censorship» legislation.

Equality and non-discrimination
LGBT people
Over the past 4 years, the LGBT community in Russia has faced increased responsibility for LGBT propaganda. Instead of implementing the recommendations of the previous review, the Russian Federation introduces additional discriminatory restrictions for citizens based on their sexual orientation and gender identity.

In 2018 UPR, several recommendations were accepted by Russia (namely, 147.123, 147.124 — 147.129). None of them were implemented and the situation worsened.

On November 24, 2022, State Duma adopted the law about complete ban of the so-called «LGBT propaganda» among all age groups. The penalties in the new law show that the state equates the dissemination of information about LGBT people with the distribution of child pornography. The articles contain such a poor choice of legal wording. e.g. «that may cause a minor to change his gender» or «may invoke interest to pedophilia» or «obtrusion of information about pedophilia», that word-by-word interpretation in fact enables legal persecution for any public discussion about pedophilia and transgenderism, disregarding its actual character or purpose. In general, this legislation has such legal deficiencies as the absence of strict terminology, vague wording or even internal contradictions. All these deficiencies might contribute to arbitrary and inconsistent enforcement that would be innately inimical to freedom of speech.

The first goal of this law lies not in the punishment of separate individuals, but rather in the ban on all and any information about LGBT. There are already numerous cases of fines under this legislation, and the trend is expected to deteriorate. The second goal of this law is to rally citizens around the ideology of «traditional Russian values''. The state propaganda machine began to use the hatred against LGBT community at the beginning of a Russian full-scale invasion.

According to the law, cases of propaganda should be investigated by the police. However, Sphere Foundation is aware that since 2019, the FSB has been systematically engaged in identifying «propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations» on the Internet. The involvement of the FSB shows us that countering information about LGBT is part of high-level government policy.

LGBT related projects started to get blocked online by mere decision of governmental body — the Federal Youth Agency, instead of court decision. This Agency is entitled to issue the blocking of information inducing children to crime and life-threatening acts (e.g. roofing) by the Federal Law 149-FZ, the Agency adopted temporary instructions on how to identify such information and arbitrarily expanded the scope of supervised content by adding LGBT-related content.

Russia doesn’t have neither national strategy nor relevant legislation related to combating discrimination of LGBT including combating stereotypes related to LGBT people. These stereotypes support the discrimination and hate violence towards LGBT people and lead to specific crimes like «fake dates». The police and the courts systematically ignore the motive of hate. Often the victims of hate violence are the part of other vulnerable groups (such as migrants). Despite the provisions supposing punishment for inciting hatred or enmity, authorized persons systematically refuse to open cases because of inciting hatred or enmity against LGBT .

Disruption LGBT events created by Russian police is also of high concern. Often such disruptions happen after complaints of pro-government activists.

In Russia same-sex unions don’t have means to be recognized by law. The new judicial practice appearing in 2022 raises a lot of concerns — at least two marriages, where after the marriage one of the partners changed legal sex were invalidated by the courts.

Racial and ethnic discrimination
In the last review cycle, Russia accepted numerous recommendations regarding racial and ethnic discrimination (namely, 147.72 — 147.80, 147.82 — 147.88). Yet, the situation worsened and none of the recommendations were implemented.

Racial profiling
Russian law enforcement authorities have been practicing racial profiling since at least Chechen wars and the fight against terrorism that gained momentum in the 2000s. Sociological study showed that the police check passports of foreign citizens at the entrance to Moscow metro stations. A study of the court practice shows that the police practice racial profiling under Article 19.3(1) of the CAO. Racial profiling often takes place as part of the performance of duties of the police to protect public order and public safety, patrolling, or as part of migration or anti-terrorist and anti-extremist control or a special operational measure. Police officers target people of «Asian (Caucasian) appearance (nationality)» or «natives of Dagestan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan».

Moreover, intensifying use of technology in the law enforcement might worsen the situation with racial profiling. Since 2011, facial recognition technology has already been used in Moscow. It is planned to extend the application of this technology to other regions. Russian courts believe that facial recognition technology does not infringe the right to respect for private life and, therefore, cannot violate human rights.

At present, data for algorithmic profiling is collected through compulsory fingerprinting. Those detained during mass arrests at public assemblies are subjected to forced fingerprinting and photographing, in violation of the requirements of this law. In the future, law enforcement authorities can use facial recognition technology to follow people who have shown their dissent to the policies and actions of the Russian state.

Minorities’ rights
The Russian government also did not comply with the recommendations on supporting ethnic minorities in preserving their languages and amending the national legislation in conformity with article 27 of ICCPR, but, on the contrary, carried out actions that violated these recommendations.

In July 2018, the State Duma adopted amendments to the law «On Education in the Russian Federation», making the study of national languages in the national republics voluntary. In practice, this law has defunded all language study programs.

Census data record a steady decline in the level of native language proficiency among the population. In Buryatia, as in other national republics of Russia, grassroot efforts to preserve native languages run up against the federal government programs.

Even prior to these laws, efforts at preserving language had been challenged by the lack a coherent system of continuous learning of the native language, the underdeveloped level of national language environments, weak motivation, the lack of federal targeted programs for the preservation languages of the peoples of Russia, insufficient presence of such languages on the Internet, etc. That was especially traceable in Buryatia.
After amendments to the Constitution of Russia in 2020 the Kremlin has openly promoted the primacy of the Russian people as a state-forming one. The purposeful destruction of national languages is one manifestation of this policy.


The Russian government has failed to ensure effective non-discrimination and equality of national minorities, including ending structural and systemic discrimination and encouraging affirmative action.
Everyday racism in Russia is noted in many parts of people’s lives, and is not at all condemned by the authorities, but, on the contrary, supported. Extremes in the form of racial violence became less frequent, yet, the levels of casual xenophobia are quite strong.

Racist practices and discrimination themselves are in the zone of silence and invisibility. These practices are so embedded in institutional regimes and everyday life that they are not considered racist.

Russia’s Ethnic Minority Casualties of the 2022 Invasion of Ukraine
Russian authorities don’t disclose any data on the ethnic composition of the Russian Army and National Guard, complete and up-to-date lists of Russian military personnel also aren’t available. Information on the Russian-side casualties of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine is very scarce and fragmented as the Russian authorities deliberately cover up the true scale of Russian losses in Ukraine. In one of the few official information pieces, on September 21 the Russian Minister of Defense announced that 5,937 Russian troops had died in Ukraine. Yet, as of February 23, 2023, the death of at least 15,136 military personnel has been confirmed by activist groups and research journalists.

From the first days of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, it became obvious that ethnic minorities are overrepresented both in the Russian invasion force and among the Russian-side casualties. The Free Buryatia Foundation analyzed the ethnic composition of confirmed casualties from the Russian side in 2022.

The majority of Russian-side casualties are ethnic Russians; however, Russians make up 80,9% of Russia’s population and only 70,6% of Russia’s casualties. Interestingly, a significant part (about 10%) of them have Ukrainian surnames. The percentage of ethnic Buryats among the Russian-side casualties is 2,3%, while Buryats make up only 0,34% of Russia’s population. Similar disproportion as for Buryats is observed for Tuvans and Kazakhs. Chechens, Dagestani ethnicities, and Kalmyks are also overrepresented, but to a lesser degree. Indigenous peoples also appear overrepresented, especially taking into account that they are exempted from mandatory conscription into the Russian Army.

The ethnic inequalities we have discovered stem from a number of reasons, including economic inequality, both among Russia’s regions and within the regions where ethnic minorities live, discrimination, and Russian military leadership’s policies.
Religion and belief
Despite numerous recommendations regarding the usage of anti-extremism legislation to outlaw religious groups (147.199, 147.90, 147.206, 147.200 — 147.207), the practice stayed and deteriorated.

The Russian Federation’s current law on extremism, adopted in 2002, defines extremism as any activity aimed at inciting social, racial, national, or religious hatred, as well as the establishment of supremacy of one social, racial, national, religious, or linguistic group over others. However, this definition is too broad and imprecise, allowing the government to use it to suppress dissent and stifle political opposition.

For example, the government has labeled several religious groups, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, as «extremist» and banned their activities. Such actions contravene international human rights law, which guarantees the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. According to a website covering the persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses, as of March 2023, 694 believers were involved in criminal cases, more than 300 are currently in prisons.

Association and assembly
Association
In spite of the earlier recommendations, civil society organizations faced unprecedented pressure by the Russian authorities since the 3rd Universal Periodic Review. By the beginning of the full-scale invasion, most of the notorious Russian human rights initiatives and independent media outlets were pushed out of the country or cracked down, their legal entities being liquidated and their employees facing risks of criminal prosecution.

The activities of Russian NGOs and other representatives of civil society are very limited due to the laws on «extremism», «foreign agents», «undesirable organizations». In 2019-2023, 110 organizations and 254 people were included in «foreign agent» registries, 63 organizations were recognized as «undesirable». As of March 20, 2023, there are 406 «foreign agents» and 81 «undesirable» organizations.

Due to the latest amendments of 2022 to the law on «foreign agents» that replaced all previous foreign agent regulation and made it even more hostile and discriminative, a person or an entity which is «under the foreign influence» can be recognized as such. The Parliament also expanded the list of restrictions that are imposed on «foreign agents» and widened legal grounds to liability for non compliance with a number of requirements and restrictions. Up to 5 years of imprisonment could be a sanction for not registering voluntarily as a foreign agent, as well as for 2 violations of «foreign agent» legislation. There is already a criminal case opened under the amended article.

The informal consequence of designation as a ‘foreign agent’ is becoming a target for a smear campaign. State-related media and public officials such as the State Duma deputies regularly mention human rights defenders, journalists and activists using such terms as ‘traitors’. The law now is basically the main discrimination ground of associations’ and media, has a huge chilling effect and is a reason for self-dissolution for 21 organizations since 2019. Thus, since 2019, these laws were used to significantly limit the freedom of association in Russia and attack all independent organizations and media outlets.

The list includes the main Russian federal and region LGBT organizations as well as vocal LGBT activists. The LGBT rights initiatives and activists faced numerous public accusations in ‘propaganda’ and ‘manipulations with fragile children’s psyche. Since 2022, the prosecutor’s office has been investigating Aleksandr Voronov, the CEO of the LGBT-initiative group Coming Out, for cooperation with an ‘undesirable organization’. Also, after amendments to «LGBT-propaganda» legislation, for LGBT rights initiatives any public activity may lead to a 5 million roubles (~65'000 USD) fine and 3 month suspended operations.

The broad definition of extremism was not changed and has been used to suppress legitimate political and social activities, including peaceful protests, human rights advocacy, and religious expression.
Moreover, forcible liquidation of NGOs is one the frequently used tools of Russian authorities aimed at suppression of civil society. During 2022-2023, the authorities dissolved at least 7 Russian human rights NGOs. In 2023, the same is already happening with Moscow Helsinki Group and SOVA Center.

After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian authorities started to target NGOs and other representatives of civil society that publicly expressed their disagreement with the war with Ukraine. Further risks were introduced for the remains of Russian civil society in February 2022 with the ‘war censorship’ legislation.

Assembly
During the last review process, Russia accepted numerous recommendations regarding upholding the freedom of assembly (namely, 147.61, 147.64, 147.123, 147.155, 147.157, 147,162, 147.165, 147.175, 147.176, 147.180). None of those recommendations have been implemented, and the situation gradually worsened. As regarding the detentions’ of peaceful assemblies participants, in 2019-2022, OVD-Info documented at least 50 463 such detentions. Among them are almost 20 000 detentions during anti-war protests.

Practice of non-authorization of public events practice continues — since 2016 and by mid-2022, the courts received 6,987 complaints about refusals to authorize assemblies, many of which were considered after the expected date of the assembly.

Excessive force used by police was documented at all major rallies which happened in Russia in 2019, 2021 and 2022. In particular, in 2021, such reports included cases of targeted beatings, torture in police departments, threats of physical and sexual violence, and actual attempts of it. In 2022, OVD-Info documented at least 413 similar reports about police violence during anti-war protests. At all stages of detention, protesters face harsh conditions.

Administrative and criminal prosecution in regards to freedom of assembly continues. At least 114 criminal cases have been opened in connection with the rallies since 2019. In 2019-2022, 41 987 cases under Article 20.2 of the CAO («Violation of assembly rules») were considered by the Russian courts. After March 2022, the protesters and single-picketers are also prosecuted under the Article 20.3.3 of the CAO («Discreditation of the Russian Army»).

The defenders and attorneys are often refused entry to police departments to provide legal help to protesters, including by introducing the «Fortress» contingency plan — a secret plan to repel an armed attack on the department. In 2019–2022 alone, there are more than 200 cases of non-admission of defenders on the pretext of such a plan. There are no effective remedies.

Facial recognition technologies have been used to find and prosecute participants in peaceful assemblies, as well as to prevent future participation. Their use is arbitrary and not based on law. In 2021-2022, at least 595 people were detained based on facial recognition technologies.

In addition, participants and organizers of public events are faced with demands for large material compensation for police work, threats of dismissal or expulsion from universities, attention from guardianship authorities and military draft commissions. The authors of posts and reposts about the assemblies are prosecuted as the «organizers» of the assemblies.

As regarding the legislation, further restrictions were introduced, such as a ban on holding or financing assemblies by entities and persons designated as «foreign agents» and cumbersome requirements to use dedicated bank accounts for expenses incurred in organizing the assembly, submitting financial statements, and returning unspent money to all of the donors. The places where assemblies are authorized were also restricted by the federal legislation, notwithstanding the Constitutional Court decision of 2019.

Since 2022, COVID-19 has been and continues to be used as a basis for refusing to approve assemblies, as well as for persecuting their participants and single-picketers. In most regions, public events were completely banned, in some — seriously limited. This ban has been selectively enforced, with pro-government rallies and events allowed to proceed while opposition protests have been suppressed. As of 2023, COVID-19 bans on rallies are still in force in some regions, including Moscow and Saint Petersburg.

Participation in public and political life
One of the recommendations accepted by Russia in the previous cycle was to ensure exercise of political competition through free and fair elections. Yet, it was not implemented. Elections in Russia are not free and unequal, and are held in conditions of limited basic political rights and freedoms, including the right to be elected for a significant number of citizens. Under such conditions, it is impossible to establish the real will of the voters.

The main problem of the Russian elections in 2022, in terms of ensuring the conditions for the free expression of the will of voters, was a large-scale attack on the remnants of freedom of speech and freedom of expression in Russia. At the moment, most citizens are deprived of the opportunity to receive alternative official information about the most important issues in the life of the country, as well as to freely express their opinion.

Repressions against opponents of the government and the exclusion of candidates for elections led to the fact that the spectrum of political forces represented on the ballots differed significantly from the political spectrum of Russian society itself.

The elections held in 2022 were also characterized by: manipulation of legislation on the eve of the elections; a radical decline in the standards of openness and transparency in the activities of election commissions; forceful pressure on commission members, observers, candidates, their proxies and media representatives; mass, organized by the state, coercion of voters to vote; creation of wide opportunities for falsification of voting results.

Violence against women
During the third UPR cycle, Russia received several recommendations on combating gender-based violence against women and girls, including those which Russia has accepted (e.g., 147.57, 147.114, 147.116-147.117, 147.118-147.120, 147.238-147.244, 147.272-147.273). However, Russia has not implemented these recommendations from the third cycle.

Regarding domestic violence against women and girls, despite numerous recommendations provided by the CEDAW Committee and the ECtHR, Russia is failing to adopt comprehensive legislation to prevent and address domestic violence and ensure that all cases of gender-based violence are promptly and thoroughly investigated. Women remain largely unprotected. In the study conducted by one of the authors of this submission, the analysis of verdicts from 2011 to 2019 indicates that 65,8% of women were murdered as a result of domestic violence, i.e., 12,209 out of 18,547 women died at the hands of a partner or relative. In 2020 and 2021, the rate of lethal domestic violence increased significantly. 70,9% (in 2020) and 71,7% (in 2021) of all women killed were killed by either a partner or relative. A recent study demonstrates that 21,8% (38.2% top estimate) of women reported to interviewers experiencing physical violence during their lifetime. This rate is higher than globally.

Regarding sexual violence against women and girls, Russia’s legal system provides a number of opportunities for perpetrators to escape criminal liability or punishment. The definitions of sexual violence crimes fail to require lack of consent as an element of crimes of sexual violence and that any consent must be given voluntarily as the result of the person’s free will. Instead, the narrow definition of rape and sexual crimes in the CC requires violence, threat of violence or abuse of the «victim’s state of helplessness». Coupled with gender biases and stereotypes and victim blaming in the justice system, such definitions of sexual violence crimes allow actual and potential impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence crimes. According to various studies conducted by the authors of the present submission, only about 3-15% victims of sexual violence file a report with the police. As a result, only 1% of the perpetrators reported by female respondents in the survey had been subjected to criminal punishment.

Women in North Caucasus
Although the third cycle recommendations do not specifically mention women’s rights in the North Caucasus region, a number of recommendations, namely, 147.248 and 147.251, can be attributed to the situation — they were not implemented. In the North Caucuses of Russia violence against women and children is widespread and integrated in to social and family structure, including, in the form of traditional harmful practices as honor killings, forced marriages and female genital mutilations (FGM/C) of underage girls.
SJI’s reports in 2016 and 2018 revealed that FGM is practiced on girls under three years old in highland villages in the Republic of Dagestan, often performed at home with knives to control female sexuality. The «medicalization» of FGM in Russia is also becoming more prevalent, with private medical clinics offering and advertising the procedure without punishment for doctors or parents.

Honor killings are still prevalent in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan, where close male relatives murder girls and young women for suspected «misconduct, » and in one-third of cases, the court commutes the punishment for the accused due to the victim’s behavior, according to SJI’s 2020 research.

Forced marriages, including bride kidnapping, pose a severe risk to girls' lives, as their own relatives may see sexual relations as a threat to the family’s honor, and perpetrators are rarely punished. In some cases, national criminal laws allow adults to avoid punishment for raping a minor by marrying the victim, which perpetuates these crimes.

In the North Caucasus, civil courts issue custody decisions in favor of women, but these decisions are often ignored by the families of former husbands, who abduct the children during meetings with the father or with the help of relatives and friends.

Due process
During COVID-19, epidemiological measures disproportionately restricted guarantees of the right to a fair trial. The principle of public trials was almost completely abolished. The courts were completely closed to the public from 19 March until 11 May 2020. From 12 May 2020, only some courts began to allow visitors, who are not participants to particular proceedings; courts occasionally adopted measures to compensate for the limitations of the principle of public hearing like broadcasting of proceedings. Moreover, the Russian courts demonstrated inability to communicate effectively with the public in a crisis situation of Pandemic.

During the COVID-19 the right to defense was limited, for instance, the confidentiality of negotiations between the defendant and his lawyers during the visits of the latter to places of detention was violated. The lawyers have faced obstacles while traveling to attend a court hearing in courts of other subjects, because of the requirements of some subjects of the Russian Federation to spend days in self-isolation.

People with disabilities
Russia continues to use the term «invalidi» in official documents and public discourse despite the recommendation of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to «amend the official translation of the Convention and use terms that fully reflect the human rights model». Russia rejects a medico-social model of disability and the use of the concept of supported decision-making instead of substitute decision-making.

Persons with disabilities face limitations to independent living and integration into society, as evidenced by sociological surveys showing low levels of employment of the persons with disabilities and higher percentage of low income households with persons of disabilities. Some spheres of life are more closed than others, for instance, persons with disabilities have limited possibilities to participate in the justice system, because of the lists of disabilities and diseases precluding a person to become a judge, a prosecutor or a juror. These lists are applied automatically without examining whether a person with a disability would be able to serve as a judge or juror. Many court buildings remain inaccessible to persons with disabilities.

Involuntary hospitalization might be used to pressure activists, and physical restraints are illegally used in psychiatric institutions. In places of detention, persons with disabilities face a lack of medical care and individualized rehabilitation tools.

Corruption
In the previous cycle, Russia accepted a number of recommendations on corruption (namely 147.148 — 147.148). None of them were implemented.

As to the judicial and legislative corruption level, all polling agencies stopped publishing polls on corruption in Russia in 2019-20 for unknown reasons. In the 2020 poll, the level of public assurance that the majority of judges take bribes decreased from 61% in 2018 to 51% in 2020. According to the World Justice Project, Russia scored 0,54 (out of 1, the more is better) in judicial corruption and 0,23 in legislative corruption in 2018 and 0,52 and 0,22 in 2022, respectively. In the Corruption Perceptions Index, the Russian score remained at 28 points out of 100 in 2018 and 2022. The Russian government made several top-figure arrests, but the public anti-corruption campaign significantly stopped after the beginning of the war.

While some popular anonymous sources claimed a significant increase in judicial bribery, this cannot be firmly verified. Though the general number of convictions on passive bribery (for bribes higher than ~$150) has increased since 2018 from 3499 to 5020 (70%), this barely demonstrates the level of registered crimes since Russia has a very high latent crime rate. Considering the above mentioned, the level of judicial and legislative have not changed significantly.

As to judicial transparency, it has remained historically high in the system of commercial courts. Meanwhile, in general jurisdiction courts, decisions are often not published, and court websites do not work properly. There is no unified search system for case dockets: Moscow uses a system not compatible with other regions. The level of transparency is not equal. E.g., in Moscow, both federal and regional courts did not publish the full names of case participants though requested by law. While regional courts have changed their behavior after a complaint, federal courts refused to comply. Courts almost always refuse to proceed with cases on courts' public information access, considering that as an intervention into judicial independence. Though in December 2021, all the courts were obliged to create their pages on Russian social networks, either VK or OK, they usually just post hard-written press releases, which barely contributes to judicial transparency.

As to judicial accountability, in 2019, the role of presiding judges in courts has significantly decreased, as their approval is no longer required for the appointment of a new judge; they are no longer able to initiate disciplinary proceedings. The term of office has been limited to two consequent. While these amendments certainly decreased the administrative pressure on judges, the general level of judicial accountability to society has not changed. Nothing has been done to increase citizen participation in judges’ selection and appointment. The President’s administration plays a key role in this selection.

As to the administration accountability and federal and regional powers division, there has been a sustainably negative trend because of significant decrease in public transparency: the e-procurement system stopped publishing the names of tenders winners, assets declarations of public officials will not be published until the war ends; federal subsidies and accounts of big state enterprises have not been published as well.

Enforced disappearances
Belarusian citizens
Since 2020 Belarusian citizens temporarily or permanently residing in Russia have become especially vulnerable to enforced disappearances. Massive crackdown on peaceful protesters and opposition started in August 2020 did not limit itself to the territory of Belarus. The Belarusian government was allowed to hunt down political adversaries in the neighboring country both via official and unofficial routes. In the following years it has become apparent that the Russian Federation is willing to closely cooperate with Belarus, when it comes to persecution of political opponents, and that it actively utilizes alternative mechanisms and extrajudicial means in order to circumvent limitations of official procedures.

Between 2020 and 2023 the Moscow Helsinki Group managed to track down and document at least 10 cases of Belarusian citizens being de facto secretly extradited on political grounds to Belarus. In all cases the victims disappeared for a period of time and were removed from the protection of the law up to the moment of their discovery in pre-trial detention centers in Belarus.

In 2 cases the victims were arrested during a joint operation of security forces of Russia and Belarus. Bypassing statutory extradition procedures of Russia they were rapidly moved to Belarus and placed in detention the next day after initial arrest. As it was later revealed the operation was conducted under a secret treaty between Russian and Belarusian security services. The ‘treaty’ was never published but, according to the claim of FSB, it contains provisions that allow such speedy extraditions without judicial scrutiny. The Office of Prosecutor General refused to check the lawfulness of this operation.

In 3 cases the victims were forcefully abducted and delivered to the Belarusian KGB detention center. Despite numerous appeals to the Office of Prosecutor General and Investigative Committee, no criminal investigation into abductions was initiated and no explanation was provided. The latest case took place on 9 March 2023.

And in 5 cases the victims were subjected to the procedure of administrative deportation in full knowledge of the fact that they were criminally wanted in Belarus. The factual nature of such deportations may be considered as a forceful disappearance. After the decision on deportation enters into force the victims are taken away from migration prison in an unknown direction without notification of lawyers and relatives and handed over at the border to Belarusian law enforcement officers in a pre-arranged manner.

In 3 cases individuals in question attempted to leave Belarus for Ukraine through Russia but were arrested either on route or at the Russo-Ukrainian border under fabricated administrative charges and in 2 cases individuals were arrested under similar fabricated charges right after release from detainment under extradition check. In one of these cases the individual was subjected to deportation without final court judgment and his appeal was heard already after the fact without him being present. His whereabouts were identified five days later. No criminal investigation of unlawful deportation was initiated.

Ukrainian citizens
The Public Verdict Foundation has been receiving reports from relatives of Ukrainian citizens captured by the Russian military and forcibly transferred to the territory of the Russian Federation. Now PVF is working on 10 cases of enforced disappearance of Ukrainian civilians. These civilians were taken either from the streets or from their homes in settlements controlled by the Russian army. In some cases, people indicate the location where their captured relatives are reportedly held, according to former captives who have been exchanged and returned to Ukraine. Most prisoners are held in pretrial detention facilities or penal colonies in Russian regions bordering Ukraine. These facilities deny lawyers access to these detainees, and relatives' attempts to contact them have been unsuccessful. PVF filed at least 50 requests to various relevant Russian state agencies, but all of them refused to provide any information on detained Ukrainian civilians.

Ukrainian civilians forcibly brought to Russia are held incommunicado: they are not granted access to a lawyer nor allowed to contact relatives. This practice poses a serious risk of torture and contravenes various Russia’s international obligation.

North Caucasus
In the context of contemporary Chechnya and the North Caucasus — enforced disappearances and murders have become the tool for political repressions of the regime of Chechen leader Ramazan Kadyrov. In the autumn of 2020, the Chechen opposition telegraph channel 1ADAT published statistics on their observations: between April and October alone, security forces in the republic kidnapped more than 1,500 people. Disappearances are in fact extrajudicial killings carried out by the so-called Kadyrovtsy and Chechen law enforcement agencies. A person is detained or summoned for interrogation and then disappears.

Since 22 December (2021), more than 60 relatives of members of opposition to Kadyrov’s regime and human rights activists have been kidnapped.
Recommendations:
  • Create an ad hoc humanitarian body to search for missing persons using modern scientific knowledge in a procedure complementary to investigations;
  • Urgently address the problem of abductions in Chechnya, provide information, including available statistics, on recent complaints about kidnappings involving state agents in the region and their investigation;
  • Cease the practice of enforced disappearances of Belarusian citizens residing in Russia on political grounds, and ensure that all individuals are afforded due process and protection under the law;
  • Investigate and prosecute any officials or individuals who engage in or facilitate enforced disappearances.

Human rights obligations
In the previous review cycle, a number of recommendations considering upholding the human rights international obligations and cooperating with international human rights mechanisms were made (namely, 147.26 — 147.28, 147.29 — 147.36). Yet, none were implemented, and the situation gradually deteriorated.

Despite the fact that Russia is a signatory to the ICCPR and to Optional Protocol to it, there exists a serious issue with implementation of Committee’s decisions, especially of its interim measures under Rule 94. In 2017-2023 there are at least 7 known cases, when interim measures were either bluntly violated or simply ignored. In 4 cases interim measures requested to refrain from extradition, in 2 cases — to refrain from deportation, and in 1 case — to provide adequate medical aid to a person in detention.

The legal nature and significance of the decisions made by the Committee are not clearly defined in Russian legislation, leading to inconsistent interpretations by the Constitutional and Supreme Courts. In extradition cases, the Prosecutor General’s Office does not consider the Committee’s interim measures to be binding, and court practice varies in their treatment of the Committee’s views.
Similar positions are taken by courts in cases of deportations. And the agency responsible for management of the deportation system also holds a view that the exact legal nature of the Committee’s decisions is uncertain.

In addition, Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe due to its aggression against Ukraine. In this regard, the Russian Federation introduced a law, according to which judgments of the ECtHR adopted after 15 March 2022 will not be enforced in Russia.

Moreover, despite previous recommendations to fully implement the judgments of the ECtHR, including those related to officials accused of serious human rights violations in the North Caucasus, little progress has been made in this regard. The ECHR has issued numerous judgments related to human rights abuses in the North Caucasus. However, the Russian authorities have failed to implement the judgments in these cases, and the perpetrators have not been held accountable.
This applies to general and individual measures, including the payments of just satisfaction. The Prosecutor General already started to refuse to pay just satisfaction rewards for victims of human rights violation on the grounds of the judgements of the ECtHR adopted after 15 March 2022. Furthermore, such judgments will no longer constitute grounds for the review of cases at the national level.

Rights of prisoners
The Russian Penitentiary legislation does not have any specific guidelines or procedures for transgender prisoners. The main strategy the administration of penitentiary facilities uses in cases of transgender persons is solitary cells. Solitary cells make resocialization for transgender persons even more challenging after their sentence is finished.

Transgender individuals, like Nazar Gulevich, may be subjected to prolonged periods of solitary confinement throughout their sentences. Gulevich, a transgender man, spent over half of his 4.5-year sentence in solitary confinement due to safety concerns in a female detention center, and was later deported to Belarus upon release.

Despite claims that there are no alternative safety measures available for transgender prisoners, Innokenty Alimov, a transgender man sentenced to 4.5 years in prison, was able to leave solitary confinement and transfer to a medical unit and later a pre-trial detention center after his attorney’s intervention. In October 2022, he was transferred to a female penal colony upon his request.
These two cases demonstrate a certain willingness of the Russian penitentiary system to not only formally ensure safety of prisoners by keeping them in isolation, but also make further steps. Unfortunately, the solution remains to depend on the administration of the detention centre. The same applies to the medical examination of transgender persons in the penitentiary facilities, their access to gender-affirmative hormonal therapy, and other specific needs.

Military service
Current situation and illegal prisons
Since the beginning of the war, the Movement of conscientious objectors has recorded hundreds of people who either want to stop their participation in the crime of aggression, or who make every effort not to go to the army.

Before the beginning of mobilization, it was possible to demand the termination of the soldiers' contracts with the Ministry of Defense, and hundreds of people used this right. After the start of mobilization, it became almost impossible. MCO now faces thousands of people who are either insisting on their right to alternative civilian service or demanding demobilization on medical grounds.

The reaction of the military commanders to such a big number of conscientious objectors was the creation of illegal prisons, the so-called «cellars». In these prisons, with the help of torture, conscientious objectors who refused to go to the front line are illegally detained. The most notable for the last year were the cases of Bryanka in July and Zaitsevo in November. About 300 people were illegally detained in each of these camps, more than 13 such camps are known at the moment. Officially, Russian authorities call these prisons Psychological Rehabilitation Centers.

The current persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses also affects their right to conscientious objection to military service. Jehovah’s Witnesses are afraid to say anything about their beliefs in the process of applying for alternative civil service because they are afraid of being accused of extremism.
Alternative civilian service in Russia remains punitive and discriminatory in terms of duration and conditions. The military service in the Russian Federation is 12 months, while the alternative civilian service is 18-21 months. The conditions for alternative service are punitive in nature.

Mobilisation
After the announcement of mobilization, human rights defenders faced mass kidnappings of people. Raids were taking place in hostels, subways, shelters for the homeless and entrances of residential buildings. Call-up papers were issued to all caught citizens without respecting the territorial principle. This means that medical and any other documents that are in the military commissariat at the place of registration of a citizen are simply not reviewed by the military commissariat, where a person is taken after a raid. People were threatened with criminal prosecution if they refused to go to the military unit. However, the maximum punishment that is currently adopted for evading mobilization is a fine of 10 to 50 euros. Nevertheless, being in a frightened state, people agree to mobilization.

Ordinary conscription
With regard to the ordinary conscription, draftees are more protected by law than the mobilised people because this is the ordinary procedure which was operated for the last 30 years without major changes.

Human rights violations persist in the alternative civil service system due to the absence of an independent civil decision-making body. In practice, the decision to replace military service with alternative civil service or deny such a replacement is made by representatives of the military commissariat, with no funding for the Draft commission and its sessions held at the Military commissariat.